“Gaza-fication” is a name that can be given to strategic bombardment in of the Israel-Hamas war. It has undoubtedly set a new standard for the role of civilians in war last seen at this appalling scale in the unrestricted use of aerial bombardment in the second world war. Russia has foreshadowed the practice against Grozny and elsewhere in Chechnya and continues in its on-going bombardment of civilian targets in its war against Ukraine today.
Israel has used its missile and air strike power against an entrenched and implacable Hamas enemy while evincing little concern for established norms for the protection of civilians. The latter has included the threat of starvation and denial of health services. Israel continues bombardment today against remaining Hamas forces in Gaza and its other enemies in the Mideast.
Israel also continues to rewrite a victor’s history of the actual damage that has been inflicted on Gazans with the intention of shaping the political leadership of a post-Hamas Gaza favorable to Israel. It is fair to say that Israel has enjoyed success in weakening the sense of moral opprobrium attached to attacks on civilians that had developed internationally in the years since 1945. Sympathy for the suffering of Gaza’s population from Israel’s attacks, manifest on television everyday, has sharply eroded acceptance of Israeli policy under President Netanyahu. But the precedent has been set.
Factions in China’s leadership today would doubtless find lessons in the Gaza war that apply to Taiwan. A war between China and Taiwan, supported by its U.S. and other allies, would likely be “Gaza-fied.” Experts in Chinese history and politics can estimate how much strength and importance China will accord to the strategy. Its key element is relentless air/missile bombardment of all territory in Taiwan not known to be favorable to Beijing.
Much, but not all, of Taiwan’s leadership is viewed by China as implacably hostile to yielding control of the island. Thus, it can only be subdued by military force, which would necessarily include denying the island support by its allies and could extend to Gaza-fied attack.
All the ingredients are present for a big, likely long, and certainly bloody war, with the main victims being the people living on Taiwan. The Gaza experience suggests that China need not be overly concerned with outrage in the “international community” no matter what its war does to Taiwan. Indeed, China does not have to win on the ground in Taiwan. It just has to refuse to stop fighting and let a Gaza-fied war grind Taiwan into dust before the world’s eyes.
Gaza-fication, supported by drone technology, adds significant new burdens on Taiwan’s defensive forces and those of the U.S. and Taiwan’s other allies: 1) sustained air-missile defense against China’s bombardment; 2) defense against China’s attack on Taiwan’s own air-missile defenses; 3) defense against attacks on resupply of the island by air transport; 4) defense against China’s sub-surface naval blockade of Taiwan; 5) defense against invasion of the island; and 6) support for Taiwan’s population of 24 million with food and protection against disease.
Whose flag flies over Taipei is of tremendous strategic importance. If Beijing’s ensign replaces that of the Republic of China, the CCP under Xi and his successors will use Taiwan as a point d’appui to contest for control of the Western Pacific.
Clio's Musings 