This blog aims to contribute to understanding the history of the US Navy during the Cold War and to draw lessons from that and earlier periods for the current era of great power competition.

I’m examining and evaluating some of the major components of what might together constitute a 21st century Maritime Strategy. I’m a political scientist who worked at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) from 1969 to 1999, with a group that supported and critiqued ONI and OPNAV planners in what was then Op-06. Our main effort was devoted to the analysis of the Soviet military press. We had some success, as described in my “The Return of Great Power Competition: Cold War Lessons about Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and Defense of Sea Lines of Communication,” Naval War College Review, forthcoming. I served as the director of the group from 1974 to 1989. The job mainly involved trying not to get in the way of my talented and dedicated colleagues. With James McConnell, I was co-editor of, and a contributor to, Soviet Naval Diplomacy (Pergamon Press, 1979). I retired as a Captain in the Naval Reserve after service in Naval Intelligence.

While I am much in debt to Peter Swartz and Steve Wills—both currently at CNA—and former CNA-ers Bruce Powers and Tom Anger, the ideas expressed are my own. I offer five think pieces for critique and commentary. Each addresses a strategic mission of the Navy, cast at the level of using the Navy as a whole, to support the nation’s peacetime diplomacy and to deter—or, if unavoidable, to fight—a war with Russia or China and to deal with the “post-war” world. I approach these subjects via the logic of the strategic situation as seen from the US point of view. Any references to Russian or Chinese attitudes are drawn entirely from secondary sources. My focus is today. Future forces are not addressed. Each post opens with a statement of purpose, definition of terms, and descriptions of assumptions, followed by outlines of possible actions and assessments of their pros and cons. Though I try show the theoretical roots of these ideas, my aim is to suggest answers to the practical question: Okay, what do we do next?

Stay tuned for more and please follow to be notified when I post updates.

Bradford Dismukes

Global Embargo vs. Russia 3-2-20

Introductory Note

This post was formerly called Global Blockade vs. Russia. The new title is recognition that using “blockade” inhibits clear thinking. “Blockade” blurs the distinction between ends and means. Embargo (preventing a state’s commercial use of the sea) is what produces the coercive effect that leads to strategic result in war (the end). Embargo enforcement (the means) is what the US and allied navies do, along with a host of other non-violent measures taken by the US and its allies. This confusion is an underlying reason that the Navy ignores “blockade.” The word itself does not appear in the 2019 DOD Dictionary of Military Terms nor in any official statement of the Navy’s strategic purposes since 1945.


Because of globalization Russia has become vulnerable to strategic coercion from the sea.
In an Article 5 war with Russia, NATO should declare a complete embargo on Russia. Embargo would deny it use of the world ocean for any purpose, military or civil, on a global scale.
All Western navies, along with land-based military power, should enforce the embargo until Russia agrees to the restoration of the status quo ante, at a minimum.
Embargo does not threaten Russian territory nor the regime in Moscow and thus is consistent with NATO’s self-definition as a defensive alliance.
The Navy should assess two separate questions: 1) embargo’s strategic promise and 2) the operational feasibility of embargo enforcement (E2). These should not be conflated nor officially ignored and left to analysts in the public domain.
If analysis shows embargo/E2 is likely to contribute toward deterring war or producing an acceptable outcome in war, NATO should immediately and publicly incorporate embargo in its strategic plans vs. Russia.


To assess the potential of embargo enforced through naval and other military action in a war with Russia. Such a war must be considered as a practical matter because of Russia’s regular, often ambiguous, threats against its neighbors, especially NATO members on the Baltic Sea. It will be argued that NATO should add global embargo to whatever other measures it takes in response to Russian aggression. I am not drawing these recommendations from analysis of current Russian attitudes regarding any possible embargo that Russia might face. I am arguing from the logic of today’s strategic situation as seen from the US point of view. A detailed definition of embargo and embargo enforcement (E2) along with a critique of the attitudes of the US Navy toward them is provided in the post “Global Embargo vs. China.

Military Assumptions

The departure point is recognition that the US and its allies possess global command of the sea. Today the US and its allies can deny the use of the world ocean to all other nations. No nation can use it except at the West’s sufferance. Other nations may be capable of using their local waters—perhaps, under contested circumstances—but not the world ocean on which international commerce depends. The assumption of Western naval dominance is based on a broad reading of current relative naval capabilities, which seem, in the near term, likely to shift further in favor of the West as US building programs are implemented, and the military budgets of allies in Europe and the Pacific increase. But Russia has a naval building program too, as well as an inherited knack for technological innovation that surprised many analysts of the Soviet navy during the Cold War. Thus, this assumption must be subjected to searching analysis, as do the politico-economic assumptions that follow.

Politico-Economic Assumptions

As a result of the globalization of the world economy, even great continental powers like Russia have become dependent on the sea for their prosperity and for the economic growth necessary to underwrite their military and international security designs. The threat of denying access to the world ocean through embargo might not prevent Russia from waging a ground war on its periphery where it enjoys local superiority. However, it could exact heavy economic costs and perhaps inflict debilitating, if not fatal, damage to Russia’s long-term plans to promote internal economic development through the Northern Sea Route (NSR), and to engage the world economy on behalf of its aspirations as a great power. Experts in the functioning of Russia’s economy and in international trade must provide estimates of the consequences for the economy of being cut off from sea-borne trade. Of equal importance would assessments of the measures internal and external (including support from China) that might be taken to compensate for or even thwart entirely the effects of global embargo.

What Kind of a War with Russia

The occasion for war with Russia today that is of greatest concern is the Russian threat to a NATO ally on Russia’s western periphery. One scenario is particularly troubling: combined military-political-cyber-economic action where Russia’s specific means and intentions are ambiguous. However, Russia’s overall objectives are nonetheless clear: to intimidate a NATO ally, neutralize it, loosen its ties to NATO, or drive it out of the Alliance entirely. An embargo has promise in contributing to NATO’s responses in this case and, perhaps, in other scenarios.

Western naval thought has been, and continues to be, strongly influenced by concern with the defense of US vulnerabilities at sea, above all the sea lines of communications (SLOC) linking the US to its allies. The possibility that Russia also may have exploitable vulnerabilities at sea—its own “SLOC defense” problem—may strike some as wishful thinking. However, viewed from the vantage point of the naval planner in Moscow, it is not the West’s defensive potential at sea but its offensive potential that is likely the greater concern. The first obligation of the strategic planner, regardless of nationality, is to defend his own vulnerabilities, and Russia’s vulnerabilities at sea seem clear and growing.

The embargo/E2 concept is aimed at increasing the contribution that the US and allied naval power can make to achieve national and Alliance defense goals, specifically: 1) to deter Russian aggression against a NATO member; 2) if deterrence fails, to fight and terminate war on acceptable terms; and, 3) to provide the US NCA and NATO authorities with additional options to respond to crises where Russia’s threats and intentions may be ambiguous (e.g., hybrid warfare, “little green men,” etc.).

Proposed Actions vs. Russia

Embargo is not a substitute for action on the ground but is an additional, asymmetric measure. The US and its allies should make clear to Russia—through preparatory actions and declaratory policy—that aggression, specifically against NATO allies in the Baltic, will be met with embargo, regardless of the timing or shape of NATO’s response on the ground. All types of naval forces would be employed, including offensive mine warfare. The carrier forces of Britain and France (whose missions in an Article 5 war are currently ill defined) would play a prominent role in European waters. They would be supported by the US Navy which would also execute E2 in other theaters, the Arctic, and especially the Indo-Pacific – likely supported there by Japan and Korea and possibly others, like India.

The West and allies must credibly threaten to deprive Russia of the use of the world ocean to an extent and for a period of time viewed as strategically meaningful. Russia would face a choice between seeking or holding on to local gains on its periphery—for example, territory and/or the political compliance of NATO Baltic states—at the cost of being cut off from much of the world economy. The latter would mean a death knell for Russia’s LNG export designs.

Many of embargo’s objectives might conceivably be achieved through peacetime economic sanctions. But if sanctions alone were successful, this war scenario would not arise. In addition, international economic sanctions would have no effect on the NSR, though sanctions would likely make use of the NSR yet more important to the Russians.

In an Article 5 war, commerce and other civil activities would cease in contested waters of the Baltic and Black Seas. These areas are not addressed here. In more distant waters, US and NATO forces and those of other allies would of course attack Russian naval ships wherever they are found, but they would be secondary targets. The main focus would be on non-military, economic assets: all ships of the merchant fleet, LNG carriers, fish factory ships and other fishers, and scientific research ships. (Russian cruise/passenger ships would be a special category to be safeguarded in all circumstances.)
This strategy is in the mold of allied blockades of Germany in the two world wars, but is tailored to deal with conflict on a lesser scale against a relatively weak Russia (compared with its Soviet predecessor). Embargo and planning for its enforcement (E2) should be publicly discussed in US and NATO forums to enhance deterrent effects. Public knowledge will occur in any case because approval by NATO political councils will likely be required for such a departure from traditional NATO plans.

If there is an Article 5 war, the Danish and Turkish straits would be closed to Russian shipping by direct action. In a period of severe crisis—a period of neither peace but not yet war—Russian civil ships would be permitted to exit the Baltic and Black Seas but would be marked and shadowed by NATO naval forces including land-based air. This would send a message that they could be seized or sunk when desired—an example of using the E2 to respond to ambiguous Russian threats.

Once out on the world ocean Russian ships would obviously not be permitted to return to Russia. For reasons advanced below, seizure would be superior to sinking them. The US Navy would take the lead in organizing and backing up NATO operations in European waters and in synchronizing NATO and US-national plans, including for operations, operational security, and geographic deconfliction. The USN would also take the lead in the Arctic and the Pacific, possibly with Japanese and Korean support, and would deal with Russian maritime assets in other theaters, making the strategy global in scale. NATO’s maritime thinking—while focused on Europe—should not remain confined to European waters but become global in scope.

Historical Precedent and a Needed Weapon

Using forces at sea to answer threats and signal resolve ashore has a solid precedent in NATO’s history. During the Cold War NATO planned to do exactly that- under the rubric “Live Oak” – in response to Soviet pressure on its enclave in Berlin. Live Oak documents from the mid-1960s reveal the plan: If the Soviets made a serious but still low level provocation against the city, SACLANT planned to declare “Marcon One” in which Bloc merchant ships would be closely shadowed. If the Soviets escalated, “Marcon Two” would add Bloc naval ships to the action, with additional “Marcons” leading toward a shooting war. Live Oak focused exclusively on European and Atlantic waters – though research may reveal parallel US-only planning to deal with Soviet civil and naval ships in the Pacific. As noted, a 21st-century revival of Live Oak would be triggered by events in the European theater but would be global in the scope of its execution.

One of the great handicaps that embargo enforcement has faced in earlier eras was the moral, psychological, and political damage that arose when the ships of third parties were sunk, whether accidentally or intentionally. This problem can be eliminated by the development of a new weapon ideally suited for E2: the propulsion disabler (PD). PDs are small, smart torpedo-like devices that destroy a ship’s screws and rudders without casualties or significant damage to the rest of the ship. In a severe crisis, PDs would provide the US NCA and NATO decision makers with options lying between the binary choice of sinking the adversary’s ship or letting it sail on unimpeded. When PDs emerge (existing technologies would seem to put them within reach) they will almost certainly also pose a serious threat to Western surface ships (See the post “Propulsion Disablers“).

Embargo/E2 Pros

  • Does not directly threaten Russian territory nor the regime. An embargo strategy seems in keeping with NATO’s definition of itself as a defensive alliance.
  • Poses a threat that would be difficult if not impossible for Russia to answer in kind, except perhaps with mines, which it is likely to use in any case.
  • Shows that the US and NATO are capable of asymmetric response to today’s ambiguous threats.
  • Provides an important strategic task for the carrier forces of the US, Britain and France: sweeping the seas of distant Russian naval and civil assets, while at the same time preserving these forces as a fleets-in-being to compel the Russian navy to maintain a defensive stance and enforce Western terms for war termination and control the (see the post Fleet-in-Being).
  • Exploits NATO naval forces which, under current plans, are tailored mainly to protect transatlantic SLOCs. Whatever threat the Russians might pose to the SLOCs of the North Atlantic—almost certainly small today and for the foreseeable future—would be deflected by further tying up Russian forces on the defense. This effect alone may well justify adopting embargo/E2. In short, embargo/E2 adds offense to traditional SLOC defense (which can never be neglected, but should not constitute the be-all, end-all of NATO plans).
  • Gives NATO’s new Joint Commands additional strategically meaningful tasks
  • Shows that NATO is a military alliance of navies just as much as of armies and land-based air, that in the 21st century sea power can play more than an ancillary role in war with a continental power.

Implications/Complicating Factors, Including Nuclear Escalation

In crisis, Russia would be forced to face painful choices. The Russians would be unlikely to shoot at sea before they are ready and willing to do so ashore because: 1) their planners’ top priority is war on the ground; and 2), they know they would face a massive response against all their civil and naval ships—a threat that the West will have made clear in advance. On the other hand, in crisis, US and allied surface ships and naval air would be free to shadow Russian civil ships in numbers calibrated in response to Russian actions ashore. The net effect would be unmistakable preparations for a global embargo. Such actions would be difficult for the Russians to respond to and can be presumed to have a deterrent effect. (Russia would doubtless protest that such Western actions violate international law—to which the obvious response would be that Russia cannot appeal to the protection of international law when Russia itself is in marked violation of such law. An all too real case in point: Russia’s blocking of the Kerch Strait against Ukraine.)

In war, Russian options to respond at sea at the conventional level would be limited. Naval escort of individual civil ships by surface ships or (more likely) submarines would be possible on a limited scale, but for the civil fleets at large would be infeasible. Defended convoys might be conceivable for the Northern Sea Route. More likely, however, Russia would shut down the NSR because of the lack the assets to defend it, especially south of the Bering Strait. In addition to new LNG carriers, Russia’s significant assets at sea include a large merchant marine. Russia ranks second—after China—in the number of nationally-flagged (i.e., not flag of convenience) merchant ships. They are largely older container ships and bulk carriers, and have relatively small intrinsic value. However, they, like the world’s second largest fishing fleet, are important earners of hard currency through service in cabotage and international hauling. Seizing Russia’s assets at sea would starkly symbolize its impotence on the world stage. Seized assets might serve as bargaining chips in negotiations to terminate a conflict. Russian civil ships may be armed and resist seizure; however, Western forces would hold the tactical initiative and could enforce embargo at a pace commensurate with the course of the war elsewhere.

Whether loss of use of the world ocean would cause Russia to relinquish any NATO territory it may have gained is unknowable. The situation might become dangerously volatile if the leadership in Moscow should regard holding onto seized territory as a sine qua non of the regime’s survival.

A second unknowable is whether, in response to a successful Western embargo, Russia might escalate to the nuclear level. This possibility must be taken seriously in light of the exaggerated prominence of nuclear weapons in Russia declaratory policy and propaganda—hardly unexpected from the party that sees itself inferior at the conventional level—but also because of Russia’s concrete development/deployment of weapons to deliver them.

Because embargo’s effects come the sea and because nuclear weapons fired at sea produce no immediate collateral damage, a Russian nuclear answer to embargo/E2 would very likely first be at sea. Russia might well proclaim that Western interdiction of its Northern Sea Route was little different from attacking the Transiberian Railway. Because they are such a potent symbol of naval and national power, US CVSG(s) would be the likely targets of missiles launched by Russian submarine(s) from positions well outside territorial waters. (French and British carriers might be subject to similar Russian calculations.)

Lacking symmetrical Russian targets at sea, the US would face extremely difficult decisions about its response. Russia would probably recognize that it could not (nuclear) bomb its way out of embargo—that is, though it might inflict horrendous losses on the US and other allied navies, Russia could not prevent them from continuing to enforce embargo. Thus, Russia’s strategic position would be essentially unchanged, and it would face the possibility that the US might answer its nuclear strikes in kind —widening a now-nuclear war to its own territory. At a minimum, Russia would face world opprobrium (perhaps a bit muted from its Chinese near-ally) as a consequence of its nuclear actions.

Thus, a decision to be the first to fire nuclear weapons would hardly be an easy one. Still, reckless, Hitlerian behavior by the leadership in Moscow cannot be ruled out. Indeed, rather than accepting what it regards as defeat from embargo/E2,or any other Western action, Russia might choose to fire tactical nuclear weapons at sea against Western naval forces for political reasons not related to military purpose. Russia could hope for a demonstration effect that might fracture the Alliance, causing some members to withdraw rather than face the prospect of further nuclear escalation. These subjects are special—and probably the most likely—cases of the broader question of how the US and its allies would deal with Russian nuclear threats. These issues will have to be addressed, but they lie outside the scope of this post.

We need to remind ourselves that the first purpose of embargo is to contribute to deterrence of war. War might nonetheless come and be fought at the conventional level. If so, embargo, pursued with strategic prudence, is among the better options open to the West to strengthen its negotiating position for the restoration of the status quo ante. This last would define the minimal condition for “successful” war termination—and, because of nuclear arsenals – the likely maximal condition as well.

Embargo/E2 Cons

  • Executing E2 may not be feasible because of the large size and broad dispersal of Russia’s civil fleets and, in the near term, possible unreadiness of Western navies for the task. The question of operational feasibility must be examined with care by specialists in all the aspects of naval warfare.
  • Immediate Russian reactions to embargo might be severe because of the humiliation the regime would face from being shown unable to defend sovereign Russian assets at sea. This effect would likely attenuate as the warring parties concentrate on the war on the ground.
  • In the longer term, however, the severity of Russia’s reaction might intensify as Russian planners reckon the harmful effects on Russia’s economy of being cut off from world ocean-borne trade. These questions of Russia’s likely reaction need careful evaluation by specialists in international trade and in the Russia’s political economy.
  • Russian SSBNs might be sunk accidentally. This could cause Russia’s leaders to fear that the US intended to engage in strategic ASW to try to shift the intercontinental nuclear balance in its favor. (See the post Strategic ASW for why this would be an astonishingly bad idea). Every possible precaution should be taken to keep intercontinental nuclear forces out of play.
  • Global embargo/E2 may be viewed as too radical or grandiose to be implemented by a fractious NATO and might be blocked by those NATO members who might see it as overly aggressive.
  • Some may see US freedom of action as constrained by a closer linkage of US and NATO plans on a global scale. The USN may fear that operational security might become compromised.
  • Third parties, especially the Chinese, may become involved if their commerce is interfered with or their ships become accidental targets. China cannot be allowed to negate the effects of a embargo of Russia’s shipping. (A Propulsion Disabler weapon would be an ideal means to deal with embargo runners, under the Chinese or any other flag.) At the same time, China’s interests in unfettered seaborne commerce cannot be ignored entirely. Whatever the case, China can be expected to strongly denounce a global embargo against Russia not least because of its implications for a similar Chinese vulnerability (see Global Embargo vs. China). US plans for embargoing Russia should take full account of possible Chinese responses, which are taken up below.
  • The potency and ease of implementation of a global embargo may be misunderstood or “oversold” in US national planning processes perhaps within the Navy/JCS/OSD, but more likely outside it. This could lead to its premature use in an unfolding crisis. Preparations for global embargo should be recognized as a significant step toward war—to be taken only in extremis.
  • Success (and perhaps sacrifice) at sea may lead some in the US to escalate the political terms demanded of Russia for ending the war. It may be argued that restoration of the status quo ante is insufficient. Having just demonstrated that global command of the sea can produce major strategic payoff, there may be a (dangerous) temptation to further exploit it vs. Russia and expand its use to others. This prospect doubtless will have occurred to leaders in China.

War Termination and the Critical Role of China

If a NATO embargo proved a growing success, would war termination be on the horizon? A series of interrelated questions must be answered. First, would the Russian economy in general face sharply negative growth? How specifically would its war economy be affected? Could autarkical measures show prospect of providing relief? Could external aid, especially from China (see below) permit Russia to fight on for a considerable period?
Second, to the degree there is economic distress, would that distress translate into internal political instability and/or external military vulnerability? Specialists in Russian economic and Russian security affairs, inside and outside the US government, must address these questions to determine the desirability of a embargo strategy. Not all appear answerable, but the range of uncertainty can probably be narrowed considerably. Russia specialists will need deep liaison with specialists on China. China is the critical variable in the war termination equation vs. Russia.

China, whatever its specific interests in any Russia-West conflict, would be almost certain to follow classic balance-of-power practice: support Russia, and oppose the West. China would not wish to see Russia’s defeat at the hands of the West. It would then find itself alone facing a powerful and perhaps emboldened US superpower supported by allies in the Indo-Pacific who are neutral, if not hostile, vis-à-vis China.

Thus, China would almost certainly come to Russia’s aid. At a minimum it could easily provide a market and overland conduit for Russian grain and other exports. The remarkable development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – railroads, internal cargo handling “ports” like Khorgos on the China-Kazakhstan border, pipelines, fiberoptic cables, electrical power grids, etc.- make terrestrial commerce on a continental scale increasingly easy. Obviously China could be an overland supplier of needed goods and raw materials. (Iran might play similar roles through the Caspian.) Supplying Russia military equipment and advanced military technologies are well within China’s capabilities.


The three-way interaction between the West, Russia, and China raises a most important issue confronting strategic planners in the US: If neither Russia nor China would wish to allow the other to face defeat in a war with the West, US plans may have to encompass war, though not necessarily combat, with both parties simultaneously. This topic is taken up in more detail in the post Global Embargo vs. China.

More generally, analysis is likely to show that embargo/E2 has substantial potential to augment deterrence of war with Russia, help manage a crisis that threatens a Baltic state, and improve the chances that a war could be terminated on satisfactory terms. In addition, E2 exploits heretofore underused Western sea power – for example the British and French carriers—freeing the US Navy for other tasks.

The promise of embargo should be carefully assessed – should we do it? The operational feasibility of E2 should be similarly scrutinized – can we do it? Then we need officially sanctioned studies and games done by teams of people who combine expertise in naval operations, international economics, and deep knowledge of Russian (and Chinese) national security policy. If embargo/E2 is deemed feasible and likely to produce success, NATO should immediately and publicly adopt it as an important component of plans for defending its eastern members against Russia’s threats and possible aggressive actions.

Bradford Dismukes, San Francisco, March 2, 2020

Global Embargo vs. China 3-1-20

Introductory Note

This post was formerly called Global Blockade vs. China. The new Global Embargo title is recognition that using “blockade” inhibits clear thinking. “Blockade” blurs the distinction between ends and means. Embargo (preventing a state’s commercial use of the sea) is what produces the coercive effect that leads to strategic result in war (the end). Embargo enforcement (the means) is what the US and allied navies do, along with a host of other non-violent measures taken by the US and its allies. This confusion is an important reason that the Navy ignores “blockade.” The word itself does not appear in the 2019 DOD Dictionary of Military Terms nor in any official statement of the Navy’s strategic purposes since 1945.


The unprecedented changes in geopolitics brought by globalization have made China dependent on unfettered use of the sea and so vulnerable to coercion from the sea.

Should there be war, the US and its allies should declare an embargo on China and enforce it through all available civil and military, primarily naval, means.

Embargo, which produces effects at the level of national strategy, and embargo enforcement (E2), which is a strategy for the employment of the US Navy on behalf of embargo, are separate realms. They should be analyzed independently and not be conflated under the single term “blockade.”

E2 is a complement to other naval force employment strategies, not an alternative or substitute.

Coercion of China through E2 is robust across all scenarios for war because it operates at the fundamental level of Huntington’s “strategic concept.”

The Navy should assess 1) the operational feasibility of E2, simultaneously with other strategic tasks, and 2) the strategic promise of embargo – its effects on China’s ability and willingness to wage war.

If blockade is judged likely to contribute toward deterring war and/or producing an acceptable outcome in war, E2 vs. China should be quietly, deliberately incorporated into a 21st-century Maritime Strategy.


To assess the potential of embargo enforced through naval and other military action in a war versus China. Such a war is entirely hypothetical. We are obliged to think about it even though its consequences could be calamitous, and the US should do everything in its power to avoid it. I strongly endorse this point, as does every other analyst in the public domain. Nonetheless, human stupidity may someday prevail. So we have to contemplate and even plan for the possibility of a war vs. China.

Such planning must recognize the “security dilemma”: that everything the US may say and do that is meant to deter China from going to war against us or our allies may trigger reactions from China that make war more likely, not less. No strategy would be complete without analysis of the security dilemma and its arms control implications; however, they must be addressed in a future post.

Defining Embargo and Embargo Enforcement (E2)

In a war with China, the US would declare a complete embargo on China. The aim would be to sever China’s access to the sea and exploit the resulting coercive effects in negotiations for war termination. In addition to all civil means, embargo would be enforced through military action, primarily naval. In the past, embargo and embargo enforcement (E2) have been combined, without differentiation, under the single term “blockade.” This is a conceptual mistake (of which this writer has too long been guilty and herewith apologizes). They are two very different things, as can be seen from the analytical issues and specialities that arise from addressing each. Assessing embargo calls for specialists in diplomacy, international trade, and internal Chinese economics and politics. Assessing E2, on the other hand, requires specialists in naval warfare (and other forms of warfare that that affect E2) at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. In terms of Huntington’s “strategic concept,” E2 is a means. It exists to serve embargo. Embargo produces the desired end – strategic effect in war. These are separate realms, and the terminology of analysis should reflect that fact.

That embargo/E2 would operate at a Huntingtonian level can be further confirmed by noting that they appear likely to produce strategic effect regardless of scenario – regardless of the war’s geographic scope or the stakes over which it is being fought. (At least this writer hasn’t yet conceived of one. This observation must be subjected to careful analysis.)

To a Navy that for generations has been hostile to “blockade,” this might appear to be semantical legerdemain because of the similarities between blockade, as it has been known historically, and E2, as it might be practiced today. But these similarities are superficial because of the new strategic context. Today, denying an adversary the use of the sea is not a one-off measure like the quarantine of Cuba in 1962 or Operation Pocket Money against North Vietnam ten years later. Today, successful E2 can make embargo viable and so produce profound strategic effect on the course and outcome of a big war against a continental adversary.

Globalization has made China, a great continental power, dependent on the use of the sea and thus vulnerable to coercion from the sea. This condition has no historical precedent. It exists today and may endure for decades, at least until 1) China’s economy becomes far more reliant on its internal market and much less so on exports, and/or 2) China develops closer physical links and economic ties with its land neighbors (especially Russia, through the BRI) who can supply it raw materials as well as serve as markets for its industrial output, or 3) war forces China to turn its back on the world ocean and, through exploitation of the BRI, seek to dominate its land neighbors and ultimately Mackinder’s “world island.”

It is imperative to recognize that E2 is not an alternative to other forms of military action at sea. In a big war between the two great powers many E2 actions would unavoidably arise from the nature of the strategic relationship between the US and China. Would the US be the first great sea power not to prevent its continental adversary from using the sea? Would the US choose not to attack its adversary’s principal maritime vulnerability? Would the matter even be a strategic choice? In a war where the US is shooting at Chinese naval ships, would it allow that nation’s merchant ships to sail wherever they wish? Would China and its friends even send merchant ships out of port and into the combat zone? (Will the writer ever overcome the urge to pose rhetorical questions?)

If the Navy answers yes or simply ignores these issues, it will find its cherished, and quite valid, claim to intellectual rigor difficult to maintain.
However, some in the West see embargo as undesirable because China can compensate for and possibly elude its effects. If this were so, embargo, with or without E2, would not produce desired strategic results. Or it might be too slow acting to be strategically useful. Moreover, it might have highly undesirable side effects. Collins (cited below) observes that an embargo of China (the proper word) would have large negative effects on the economies of US and its allies and on the global economy at large, resulting in a “global economic output loss of a magnitude at least equal to that of the 2008–2009 Great Recession—if not the Great Depression itself….”

This is undoubtedly true and is a major reason that the US would never start a war with China (nor, in this writer’s opinion, would China start one with us). It should be recognized that war with China and China’s oceanic trade could not coexist. Assessments of China’s possible internal and external economic responses to a wartime embargo are obviously needed. Among other things they may provide details useful in shaping US policy for dealing with the global economy of a world at war. The attitudes and behavior of all the major states, especially allies and neutrals on China’s borders, could play an important role in determining the efficacy of embargo.

In the hypothetical case at hand, a big war that has been started by China, many states will suffer from its effects. Few will prosper. The attitudes of most states toward the warring parties will be formed to some degree by who they think is responsible for the war, but far more by who they think is going to win it. That being the case, the US should mount a vigorous campaign to gain allied and neutral support for its wartime embargo, while minimizing, as much as possible, negative economic effects on third parties.

Excluding, one hopes, attacks on the territories of the warring parties (for reasons discussed below), there should be no limits on the geographic scope and nature of embargo actions. The US and its allies would interdict Chinese seaborne trade as well as all air traffic. Maritime states whose geography might permit them to serve as “embargo-busters,” would become targets of US diplomacy and, if necessary coercive action, including via interdiction of their seaborne trade. (Continental states on China’s western border are addressed separately below.)

China would also be deprived of access to the new “blue economy” – marine energy, deep-sea mining, bio-prospecting, etc. – that some see as a bright new economic-ecologic frontier. And China would be similarly deprived of access to any of its assets lying beyond its oceanic borders. The Maritime Silk Road of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) would be shut down. Submarine communication cables connecting China with the rest of the world would be severed. With the cooperation of the host countries, the US and its allies would sequestrate all Chinese-owned properties in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. This last would be a post-colonial version of the Allies’ seizure during World War I of Germany’s colonies, German East Africa, German Southwest Africa, and Cameroon. Chinese-owned factories and agricultural enterprises would continue to operate but exclusively for the benefit of the host country. Chinese construction projects might be continued, where possible, under Western aegis. Finally, embargo would involve severance of financial and technological links. The US and its allies would force China to rely solely on its indigenous means to compete for technological superiority.

E2, aka (erroneously) Blockade, in Navy Thinking

Under the erroneous designation “blockade,” Embargo Enforcement (E2) has been the subject of lively public discussion (the work of Collins, Hammes, Mirsky, and Holmes* will be cited here). In the discussion that follows “embargo and E2 “will be used when the time frame is now or the future. “Blockade” will necessarily be used when the time frame is earlier.
Blockade is never mentioned in the Navy’s official statements of its strategic purposes in war versus China – or anyone else. Blockade does not exist as an entry in the November 2019 DOD Dictionary of Military Terms This is an amazing development. Think of it: protecting or attacking seaborne commerce, one of the main reasons that navies came into existence millennia ago, has disappeared from the 21st-century strategic discourse of the US Navy.

A review of the seven documents seen by Tangredi**as expressing the Navy’s current strategic thought shows that none addressed the concept. Among the seven, How We Fight ***is by far the most principled. It deserves brief attention as a reflection of Navy thinking today. The work describes itself as “not [sic] about hardware, platforms or systems.” (p.2). Thus it is about why and how to use such physical means. It is compelling because, like the Maritime Strategy of the mid-1980s, it looks exclusively at how to use existing forces. It does not address the acquisition of force for the future. (Later we will look at the current vs. future issue more closely.)

How We Fight offers a magisterial quote (p.26) from Mahan to make the point about navies and international commerce: “It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys…that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea that drives the enemy’s flag from it… and by controlling the great common, closes the highway by which commerce moves to and from the enemy’s shore. This overbearing power can only be exercised by great navies.”

In strategic terms Mahan provides a portal that can be entered from the defensive or from the offensive side. How We Fight chooses only strategic defense: The US Navy is to guarantee that the US and its allies have access to overseas raw materials and markets by defense against threats to that access and against threats to the transit on the sea of the resulting commerce.

Offense, in which the Navy threatens adversaries’ access and transit is not taken up. This is puzzling because Mahan’s formulation 1) seems to emphasize the offense, “closing the highway,” and 2) the US Navy is the only navy on the planet with a reasonable claim to Mahanian “great[ness].”
Blockade was not mentioned in the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, nor any Navy planning documents from earlier in the Cold War. I will hazard that the Navy has not thought about blockade as a strategic use of forces since 1945. This seems remarkable given the immense success during World War II of the US submarine blockade of Japan and its mining of Japan’s coastal waters, not to mention subsequent successful “blockades“ like the quarantine of Cuba in 1962 or the mining of North Vietnamese ports in 1972, For generations of Navy thinkers blockade is, at most, a historical concept. (Till points out (p. 245) that the US is not alone in this regard: “attack and/or protection of merchant shipping …” “hardly appears in many formulations of maritime doctrine around the world….”)

Why Has the Navy Ignored Blockade?

Explanations by outsiders regarding why blockade versus China (or anyone else) is officially ignored necessarily have a speculative tone. Many seem plausible. Let’s look at five along with a few words of critique, taking care to use “blockade” when speaking of history and “E2” when speaking of today and the future.

First, it may be that US actions taken at sea against China’s A2/AD are expected to produce the effects of a E2. China’s ports would be closed and its merchant fleet would not sail because of the risk of hostile action. Third parties, perhaps under protest, seem likely to respect US wartime exclusion zones. However, this kind of inadvertent E2 would be far less effective, and much more subject to undesirable side-effects, than one that had been planned in advance, thoroughly coordinated inside the US government and with allies and with vulnerable neutrals, and so implemented with focused operational efficiency. If you are going to end up doing E2 even if that hadn’t been your main intention, you would want to think it through and do it to best effect. For example, as in planning for E2 vs Russia, during a period of severe crisis, high value Chinese civil ships might be marked and shadowed.

Second, it may be, as Till has noted****, blockade is not viewed as “military action.” Seizing or sinking merchant ships is not the kind of self-defined “fighting” the Navy was created to do (see for example Adm, USN, Scott H.Swift, “A Fleet Must Be Able to Fight,” Proceedings 144/5/1,383 (May 2018), pp. 28–33, available at wwwusni.org/.) In a rough vernacular, we didn’t buy the F-35 to shoot at containerships. It may also be that the US Navy, whose history is steeped in defending SLOCs, does not easily conceive of itself as attacking them (despite the apparently forgotten experience of successful blockade of Japan during the Second World War).

Instead, the Navy’s post-Cold War experience with blockade, e.g., Maritime Interception Operations, shows that its execution ties forces to a specific geographic area for open-ended periods. It is a burdensome, resource-absorbing chore better assigned to allies or the US Coast Guard. Blockade has a rich history. (In addition to Till, pp. 238-41 and chap. 13, see Bruce Elleman and S.C.M. Paine (eds), Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-Strategies, 1805-2005 (London: Routledge 2006)). E2 should not be rejected today because it is seen as insufficiently warrior-like. Navy planners, warriors all, rightly pride themselves on intellectual rigor and “fighting smart.” E2 is “fighting smart.”

Third, Collins has raised a deeper issue: that consideration of blockade as a strategic option might divert attention from, and thus undercut arguments for, the need to acquire larger, more robust forces to overcome China A2/AD barriers. In the crude terminology of inter-service competition, blockade is not a “force-builder.” The Collins’ articles point to a problem that is rarely explicitly acknowledged.

Within Navy planning lies the inherent possibility that decisions about the employment of existing forces may be colored by the desire to craft the most effective rationale for procurement of future forces. At the flag level the same offices are responsible for making and articulating the justifications for both kinds of decisions. The result is neither illogical nor surprising. Armed conflict with a major opponent is not viewed as imminent, but the struggle for the Navy’s share of the national defense budget definitely is going on right now. Indeed, the task of acquiring adequate forces constantly demands the attention of the Navy’s leaders and likely has done so throughout their careers. If the rationale for use of current forces is in tension with that for acquisition of future forces, the leadership is inclined to favor advancing the rationale for future forces.

This need not be so. To the degree there may be a current-versus-future dilemma, the leadership’s first obligation should be to best use the existing Navy that its predecessors have shaped and the nation has provided. The force procurement future should not dictate the force employment present. The crucial priority today is to underwrite diplomacy and deter aggression by adversaries by being ready to fight a war and terminate it successfully if war nonetheless comes. Those seeing things otherwise would seem to have an obligation to articulate why. That means, specifically, to explain why you choose not to attack your adversary’s long standing, enduring and possibly decisive vulnerability.

Fourth, blockade not only competes as a rationale for future force requirements. It also competes for today’s Navy planning and training resources. There is only so much time, and you can’t plan and train for everything. It’s an open question whether the Navy planning system has sufficient bandwidth to deal with anti-A2/AD and with blockade simultaneously. After all, planning only for anti-A2/AD itself is today seen as an incomplete work in progress, not just within the Navy, but also outside it in the Joint arena. Similarly, training time is a precious resource and, to the degree that preparing for blockade takes time away from preparing for anti-A2/AD, hard choices must be made. Little wonder that a major “new” strategic task like E2 has been given short shrift.

Fifth, how to best use the total force is problematic. E2’s implementation would put heavy demands on the already over-stretched submarine and SEAL forces. At the same time the role that the carriers and amphibious forces might play seems less clear. But this is not an issue unique to E2. It is one that Navy and Marine Corps planners are wrestling with today. In the case of E2 US carriers, along with those of allies, would be heavily employed in the war’s initial period in sweeping the seas of enemy civil ships of all types as well as any naval forces that might try to protect them. Subsequent patrol of the world ocean to ensure that the E2 vise closes permanently. might be left mainly to allied navies, freeing US carriers for other tasks. (Aviation-capable amphibious ships – perhaps with some modifications – might be similarly employed in the war’s initial period.) Given the large size of the Chinese merchant and fishing fleets this might not be not be a brief process. Obviously, a war with China would occasion a host of other threats to allies of the US in which the carriers and amphibs/USMC could provide an urgent and highly useful response – e.g., to North Korea’s threat to the South, Russia’s aggression against NATO members on its western periphery, Iranian moves in the Mideast.

Military Assumptions

It is assumed that the US and its allies possess global naval dominance. This assumption is based on a broad reading of current relative naval capabilities, which, for the near term, seem likely to shift further in favor of the West as US building programs are implemented and the military budgets of allies in Europe and the Pacific increase. In local waters near China, China may or may not be able to prevent the US from achieving control, should it seek to. But the US can almost certainly deny China control even of waters near China. For example, China might try to express its “sovereignty” over the South China Sea by drilling oil wells there. But China would not be able to move any recovered oil to the mainland if the US chose to prevent that action. Similarly, if China were to seize Taiwan, the US might harass or even interrupt its sea communications with the mainland. However, the balance of forces is rarely static. China’s naval capabilities are improving at an accelerating rate. This assumption must be subjected to searching and continuing analysis, as do the politico-economic assumptions that follow.

Politico-Economic Assumptions

Embargo, underwritten by E2, would be likely to have direct and far-reaching consequences. China is already heavily dependent on seaborne import of energy, raw materials, and even foodstuffs. Though they have been heavily analyzed, it is not imports that are the first, likely key, mechanism of embargo’s coercive effect. Trade dominates China’s economy, accounting for over half of China’s GDP in 2012, according to the CIA Fact Book, cited by Hammes. The remarkable, decades-long growth of China’s economy has been driven by export of manufactured goods. Much of its economy is structured to produce and sell exports, many as intermediate products in a global supply chain or as end products tailored exclusively for Western customers. Depriving China of its exports would have a strong disruptive effect. It would be the job of experts on China’s economy and on its political system to estimate the size of such effects, the measures that China might take in compensation, and the likely consequences for China’s internal political stability and its ability to wage war.

As for imports, the effects of embargo must be evaluated in light of their totality—fuel, raw materials, manufactured components, foodstuffs—not fuel alone. Even though the effect of the loss of imported oil might be evaluated to the third decimal point, as do the two Collins articles, they are simply not the defining measure of the consequences for China of a total cut-off of its oceanic trade. Again, trade, both imports and exports, is a topic for experts on China’s economy and politics to evaluate with as much precision as possible.

More important than the lucubration’s of Western analysts are the views held by the Chinese themselves. In 2003, President Hu Jintao’s publicly acknowledged that China faced as “Malacca dilemma,” alluding to its broad dependence on imports of oil from the Gulf and its inability to defend that vulnerability. Experts on China can give informed explanations for President Hu’s admission. It may be as prosaic as an acknowledgment of an obvious and undeniable fact. More recently, the Economist (July 6, 2019, p. 47) quotes “Hu Bo, a prominent naval strategist at Peking University…” as saying “…it would be a ‘suicide mission’ for China to take any actions that might provoke a blockade….” It’s intriguing but probably impossible to know what President Hu and professor Hu think of Westerners’ views that China is not vulnerable to coercion from the sea, or, if it might be, such effects would be too slow to have strategic utility in war. As noted, this latter possibility, also expressed by Collins, suggests a difference in planning horizons: US – short and eager; Chinese – long and patient.

What Kind of War with China

Hammes and Mirsky underline that the determinants of the desirability and the details of blockade against China would be dictated by the nature of the war to be deterred/fought: the stakes in contention and the nature of the aggressive actions that China might take that are to be deterred or, if need be, responded to, plus the alignment of regional powers in the fight. I offer an alternative view. Because E2 is to operate in a new globalized world where even the great continental powers may be vulnerable to coercion from the sea, E2 is in fact quite robust. E2-supported embargo would be effective independent of scenario or of the stakes of the war envisioned or actually being fought. I respectfully suggest that those seeing things otherwise should articulate the reasons why.

It is nonetheless useful to examine plausible scenarios to understand better how E2 might work in concert with other uses of the sea power of the US and its allies.

What scenarios? As this is written in the spring of 2020, it is difficult to see beyond two issues that might lead to war between China and the US: 1) the security and sovereignty of Taiwan; and, 2) China’s territorial claims to waters and islands in the South and East China Seas. The first issue is the big case that requires planning for a major US response. Such a conflict would likely have a fairly discernible binary outcome: Either Taiwan remains independent or it is absorbed into China. The US would be unlikely to accept the latter because of the democratic ideals of self-determination that underpin America’s security policy as well as reasons of raw Realpolitik. Such stakes mean that whatever else the US does in response, it should be prepared to impose a full global embargo against China and keep it in force until China agrees to the restoration at or near the status quo ante.

The second issue is more complicated because the stakes that may be in contention are ill-defined. It is difficult to specify in advance what would constitute victory or defeat: who wins or loses what. Purely for purposes of illustration, I will posit here that war with China could arise as a result of aggressive Chinese military actions to assert sovereignty over contested islands or waters. In this case, something less than all-out embargo might be employed—its extent and duration calibrated to meet the possibly ambiguous circumstances at hand.

Proposed Actions vs. China

These actions are generally the same as those against Russia (see the post “Global Embargo vs. Russia“). However, because of China’s sense of deep historical grievance against the West, public characterization of E2 vs. China should be as carefully crafted as possible to minimize the danger that China could claim, to its own people and to regional neighbors, that it is being “bullied” by a US antagonist who is over-exploiting a position of strength.

There are a number of other important differences. In contrast to Russia, China can achieve its possible military objectives only by controlling the seas along its periphery—to invade Taiwan or to exert sovereignty over claimed islands and waters. (This assumes that China would have no reason to invade its southeast Asian neighbors nor intervene with military forces on the Korean peninsula.) While the US always has, and likely will pursue, the option of seeking to deny Chinese forces such control, E2 as it is used here, is a sea denial strategy broadly focused on the world ocean, from China’s most distant trading partners right up to China’s home waters. Hammes, Mirsky and Collins distinguish between near and far blockade. In a strategic sense the global E2 being argued here does not make that distinction, though at the operational and tactical levels, it is quite valid.

A second difference is the minimal involvement of US and allied ground forces. In the Taiwan case there would be land areas to be fought over, but not by US forces on the ground. Note, however, that embargo might nonetheless result in war on the ground. (See below under discussions “Cons” and “War Termination.”) In the second case, assertions of Chinese sovereignty over areas of the sea, the contest would be solely at sea—though obviously land-based air and missiles would play a role.

Finally, there would be no NATO-like framework for military and political cooperation with allies of the US, who may have conflicting interests in the issues at stake. The review of pros and cons that follows here will focus mainly on the second scenario, assertions of Chinese sovereignty over areas at sea.

Embargo/E2 Pros

  • The overarching advantage of E2 is that it could be implemented at little additional risk to US or allied forces—beyond the threats they already face from China’s long range anti-ship capabilities. Because relatively few Chinese wartime imports would originate in ports near China (it’s assumed that South Korea and Japan would end trade with China), ships carrying oil, raw materials, or food to the country could be interdicted at distances from China where there is little possibility that it could take defensive counteractions. (This assumption may change as China’s naval building programs progress, as is widely foreseen.) Just like the Russia case, seizure would be better than sinking Chinese ships. It is assumed that few third parties would be willing to risk ships in US-declared exclusion zones.
  • Almost as important, the US would hold the initiative at both the tactical and the operational—that is, theater-wide—levels. Individual Chinese ships could be shadowed, disabled, seized, or sunk. (See the Propulsion Disablers post.) These would be tactical/operational decisions made in light of the broader strategic context. At the theater level, the US would calibrate the intensity of the E2 actions to fit the changing situation on the strategic issue over which the war was being fought. There would be little reason for urgency arising from E2 itself. It can be presumed that, after several Chinese warships and merchant ships are disabled or sunk, Chinese decision makers would recognize the difficult position that E2 presents. (Indeed it seems likely that Chinese planners have already thought these matters through.) China specialists can offer informed assessments of China’s possible responses. I offer a general one below under the heading “War Termination.”
  • E2 uses the existing capabilities of the Navy. Upgrades in ISR (see below), improved Special Forces or other capabilities for ship seizure, possibly including reconfigured amphibious ships (not further addressed here) would be needed. Otherwise E2 might require relatively little in additional expenditures.
  • E2 would not be a US-only venture but would be a powerful coalition builder. Not only would US allies, Japan, and Korea ,contribute, but friendly nations like India, who would not wish China to emerge the victor, are like to join in. As in times past, contributions by allies would be a great force multiplier, freeing US forces for other missions.
  • E2 is an asymmetric response that would be difficult for China to answer. It could be used to augment US sea control efforts mounted directly in the South and East China Seas, or it could be used on its own. The latter would avoid sending US forces into Chinese area denial zones. (I am grateful to Steve Wills for pointing this out. Earlier I have tried to explain why this argument has not so far been found compelling by the Navy’s leadership.) E2 would render useless half of China’s BRI. China would face a difficult choice: Desist from aggressive military action – or give up all earnings from seaborne exports and expected payoff from vast investments in the BRI and overseas agricultural and manufacturing ventures. These are not only of great economic value. They also express China’s aspirations for influence befitting a global great power.
  • As in the Russia case, many of these goals might be sought through economic sanctions alone. But if economic sanctions prove ineffective and war ensues, E2 would be implemented. In any case, the underlying threat of E2 might magnify the seriousness of security-related economic sanctions and, potentially, increase their efficacy.

Implications/Complicating Factors

In contrast to Russia’s nuclear bellicosity, China, as far as I can tell, has not emphasized any readiness to resort to nuclear use except to answer nuclear threats against it. For the prudent US planner, however, the possibility of China’s nuclear response to a successful E2 cannot be ruled out. As in the Russia case, because embargo/E2’s injury to China originates from US actions at sea, the first focus of China’s response would be at sea—likely targeting a CVSG with missiles launched from submarines outside Chinese territorial waters. And, as with Russia, the absence of symmetrical Chinese targets at sea would make the decision regarding a US response extremely difficult—and so in need of intense study.

Embargo/E2 Cons

  • Embargo, underwritten by E2, might take too much time to produce effect, during which China might achieve the military goals it seeks – for example, seizure of Taiwan – and then adopt a defensive position from which it might be difficult to dislodge. This seems valid – to a point. If efforts to defend Taiwan failed, continuing E2 action could make Taiwan an isolated outpost whose communications with the mainland would be subject to US military pressure. In addition, embargo could continue to impose heavy costs on the Chinese economy for as long as the US and its allies chose to keep it in force. Whether such damage might lead China to relinquish its military gains needs to be part of the much needed larger analysis of embargo’s effects. The issue is heavily related to the next con.
  • China’s internal measures to minimize embargo’s effects on its economy might be successful enough to prolong China’s war effort beyond the period of time the US and its allies wished to continue the fight. (External support, mainly from Russia is taken up in a separate section below.) In the case of Taiwan, I believe that for the US that period might be quite prolonged. Regardless of the war’s specific issues, if the US should suffer significant losses, say several carrier strike groups, powerful momentum is likely to arise within the domestic political system to fight on as long as it takes to avenge and justify such losses. (Similar sentiments for identical reasons would be likely to arise within China.)
  • E2 may be judged too difficult to carry out. In particular, US ISR may not be up to the task of identifying, locating, and sorting out the myriad ships in the Chinese merchant fleet—the largest nationally-flagged fleet in the world. (China’s state-owned COSCO shipping company alone reportedly owned over 1000 ships in 2017.) The picture is further complicated by China’s fishing fleet, which reportedly comprises over 200,000 motorized vessels including more than 25,000 ships of 100 tons or greater.
  • Even if ISR is successfully upgraded, the task of marshaling and coordinating US and allied forces for a global interdiction campaign could be extremely challenging because of the many ports from which China’s imports originate, the large oceanic areas, and the thousands of potential targets involved, at least initially.
  • China might respond with offensive mining of the ports of US forward bases, the ports of US allies, or US ports in Hawaii or even the West Coast. An E2 strategy would dictate serious attention to US countermine capabilities.
  • If analysis shows embargo could yield the promise suggested above, US strategic thinking may come to center too much on it and other conflictual dimensions of relations with China and so let cooperative possibilities atrophy. If possible, embargo/E2 should be kept in the background of US-Chinese military-to-military diplomacy.
  • As in the Russia case, embargo vs. China might become oversold in US national security planning processes—its promise inflated and its risks understated.
  • The most dangerous—and today hypothetical—possibility is that the US NCA decides to exploit the threat or implementation of embargo on behalf of purely economic interests.

War Termination and the Critical Role of Russia

War Termination is a phase of planning that we do not give the attention that it demands. We should not conceive of war strategies, much less go into war, without having thought through how it might end. Given that the warring parties possess nuclear arsenals, unconditional surrender is a highly unlikely and highly dangerous objective. Considerable thought needs to be devoted to choosing and articulating war termination plans. No strategy is complete without them.

If a global embargo of China should become a growing military and economic success, would war termination be on the horizon? The answer may be found in a complex series of questions—some answerable, some less so. First, would the Chinese economy in general be forced into sharp contraction? How specifically would its war economy be affected? Could autarkical measures show prospect of providing relief? Could external aid from Russia (see below) permit China to fight on for a considerable period?
Second, to the degree there is economic distress, would that distress translate into internal political instability and/or external military vulnerability? Specialists in Chinese economic and Chinese security affairs, inside and outside the US government, must address these questions to gauge the desirability of an embargo strategy. The range of uncertainty can probably be narrowed considerably. China specialists will need deep liaison with corresponding specialists on Russia.

The China-Russia relationship is likely the critical variable in the war termination equation vs. China. (Note that this is probably true whether the war termination question arises as a result of embargo or any other US actions versus China – though embargo is the most vulnerable to Russian counteraction.) Mirsky terms Russia the “swing state” in this regard, the state whose actions can determine the success or failure of a US blockade (then, embargo/E2 now).

The US-China-Russia triangle may well be the cosmic issue confronting geostrategists in the first half of this century, if not beyond. It wilI doubtless take many unforeseen turns as the years unfold. I confine my comments on this overarching matter to how that interaction seems likely to play out in the particular case of a US embargo in a war with China today.

As a result of classic balance of power reasoning, Russia would be highly likely to come to China’s aid to forestall its defeat at the hands of the US. A war between the US and China would be a strategic gift to Russia that would surpass even the gift given to Iran by the US invasion of Iraq. It would put Russia in the “catbird’s seat” (to continue with folksy idiom). Russia’s own interests would be advanced by prolonging a US-China war which obviously would sap the strength of both warring parties. Russia might in effect determine the length of the conflict. By metering its material support for China, it would seek to ensure that the war has no victor.

Nonetheless, Russia’s leaders almost certainly recognize that a US-China war would present it with a difficult balancing act. If America emerged the victor, Russia would find itself facing alone an unrivaled and likely emboldened superpower. On the other hand, if China gained the upper hand, it might find might find itself once again in vassalage to its far more powerful Chinese neighbor—just as it was for 400 years to their Mongol predecessors in medieval times.

Regardless of the final outcome, immediately, Russia would likely profit handsomely from selling China fuel and foodstuffs, both of which it has in abundance. Russia and the former Soviet states would be a market for Chinese exports. In return, Russia might well demand that China provide it high tech weapons and similar products with military potential.

Movement of goods in both directions has been eased considerably over the last decades. Through the BRI, China is steadily improving the network of transport connections—road, rail, internal cargo ports like Khorgos, pipeline, and electrical power grid—that connect it with Russia. (The Power of Siberia pipeline opened October 2019 is a telling example.) Finally, It cannot be ruled out that, while the US is preoccupied with China, Russia might move aggressively in its own sphere.

Russia’s support could possibly prop up China’s economy for a lengthy period. The importance of the Russia-China dynamic dictates that policy statements, propaganda, and other public communications of both the Russians and the Chinese should be carefully analyzed for signs that the two continental powers may be overcoming their Cold War mistrust to move toward something approaching or even constituting an alliance. Today, some see that, in response to the pressure of the West’s economic sanctions, a relatively weak Russia (GDP around one-eighth that of China’s) is being drawn, perhaps reluctantly, into China’s economic and technological orbit. That either nation might go war with the US and its allies seems certain to accelerate this trend.

Beyond economic and political support to China, it is conceivable that Russia might help China through covert military action, especially undersea operations, including mine warfare, in the Pacific. Guarding against such possibilities would, at a minimum, absorb US forces. Planning for E2 vs China would need to take account of Russia’s possible military role. The US should frame US declaratory policy toward Russia and draw the boundaries of exclusion zones accordingly.

Other states like North Korea and Iran might seek to take advantage of a US-China war to advance toward their own security goals. Such actions would increase stress on US forces and indirectly aid China. The obvious focus of embargo against China would be China itself. However, war between great powers can have unknowable consequences. Thus, decisions regarding forward commitment of US and allied naval forces should be made with an eye toward fleet-in-being (see Fleet-in-Being post) and other conservative principles.

China’s Unilateral Options

Beyond benefiting from Russia’s support and in contrast to Russia itself, China possesses the capability to respond to embargo with military measures at the conventional level on its own and would have strong reasons to do so. These are rooted in China’s historical grievances against the West which play such an important role in growing nationalist sentiment in China’s population at large, sentiment that is stoked and exploited by the regime. The regime does so as a matter of calculated self interest, but that does not mean that it may not eventually become the captive of its own propaganda.

US planning must take account of the potency of Chinese nationalism. For example, US strikes on Chinese territory seem certain to generate popular support for the regime, perhaps more than enough to compensate for any loss of support that the hardships that embargo itself might impose. (I am not commenting on the military need of such strikes, but, intuitively, that need would have to be imperative in view of the highly negative political consequences that US strikes would have on the Chinese body politic.)
Similarly, the regime would likely view as a threat to its hold on power any moves that might be seen as capitulation to the US. Rational Chinese strategists, as well as more passionate Chinese nationalists, might fear that accepting defeat at the hands of embargo would turn China into a maritime vassal of a US-led alliance—meaning that it might then be able to use the sea but only on restricted terms that the US would enforce.

China does have other options. Radical undertakings by China might seem unlikely today. However, we do have the precedent of China’s intervention in the Korea War. And, after all, our departure point is already a war between the US and China. If embargo is hurting China badly and the pain seems destined to get worse, China might well choose to invade Taiwan (if it had not already done so) and underwrite a North Korean invasion of the South. (This assumes the Kim regime had not already mounted one.)

China could thus bring its greatest military asset, the PLA, into play. It could hope for quick victories on both fronts—especially if the US had not prepared for these eventualities. The result might be the loss of both Taipei and Seoul, and a big step in the redrawing of the geopolitical map: with or without Taiwan in its orbit, China would turn its back on the global ocean and with its junior partner Russia dominate MacKinder’s Eurasian “World Island.” The US would find itself leading the many fractious states of the “Rimlands,” and dominating the oceans that connect it with them.


Regardless of whether such tectonic change lies in the future, US plans have to made today. If they are to include embargo and E2 against China, they would have to be deeply Joint, starting at the strategic level. E2 at sea means reinforcement ashore in Korea, where the Kim regime has almost certainly foreseen the opportunities that a US-China war would present. Delayed and urgent dispatch of US reinforcements might well “justify” and trigger an aggressive move south by Pyongyang. E2 demands that identical thinking be devoted to stiffening the defense of Taiwan.

Embargo/E2 plans would have to made in close coordination with other departments of the Executive Branch – State, Treasury, Commerce, etc.—and with formal allies and partners. The consequences of E2 for friends and neutrals would need to be taken into account. Dealing with potentially hostile “embargo busters,” like Myanmar, would also require careful thought. Nations like India who would not wish to see China victorious might contribute significantly to policing E2 in ocean areas of interest.

I will assume that such coordinated planning of this nature can be effected because without it embargo would be unlikely to realize its full potential. If proper plans can be made, embargo/E2 would operate at the level of national strategy, would be robustly applicable across all plausible scenarios, and might be implemented at relatively low risk and with existing forces, at possibly low economic costs. It is not an alternative but a complement to anti-A2/AD, if the latter is pursued. E2-type actions will inevitably arise in any war lasting more than a a few weeks. In any case, at this time, embargo/E2 would be difficult for China to answer. Embargo/E2 would also face a daunting roster of cons.

The Navy has historically ignored blockade. If it fails to take account of the changes brought by globalization, it may well ignore embargo/E2 today. That would be a mistake. The promise of embargo should be carefully assessed -should we do it?. The operational feasibility of E2 should be similarly scrutinized – can we do it? Then we need officially sanctioned studies and games done by teams of people who combine expertise in naval operations, international economics, and deep knowledge of Chinese (and Russian) national security policy. If embargo/E2 is deemed feasible and likely to produce success, it should be incorporated into a 21st century Maritime Strategy – slowly, with minimal fanfare, vs. China in the future.


* Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 3 (February 2013), available at carnegieendowmentorg/; T X Hammes, “Off- shore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,” Strategic Forum, no. 278 (June 2012), available at wwwdticmil/; Gabriel B. Collins and William S. Murray, “No Oil for the Lamps of China?,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 61, no 2 (Spring 2008), p 88, available at wwwusnwcedu/ and Gabriel B. Collins, “A Maritime Oil Blockade – Tactically Tempting But Strategically Flawed,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Spring, 2018); Lieutenant Matthew Conners, US Navy, “Blockade the First Island Chain” Proceedings, Vol. 145/6/1,396 (June 2019).

** Sam J. Tangredi, “Running Silent and Algorithmic: The U.S. Navy Strategic Vision in 2019,” Naval War College Review, Vol .72, No. 2 (2019)

*** How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval Warfighter, No author. Foreword by Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, Chief of Naval Operations. Publisher: US Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, 2015. Available for purchase from GPO, US Government Book Store

**** Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (4th ed.) (London: Routledge, 2018), p. 241

Bradford Dismukes, San Francisco, March 2, 2020

Strategic ASW in 2019 – A Stunningly Bad Idea


To assess the desirability of strategic ASW as a wartime mission of the Navy today and for the foreseeable future. The mission is defined as attacking Russian SSBNs to alter the intercontinental nuclear balance in the favor of the US on behalf of larger purposes. During the Cold War these strategic purposes included: 1) SLOC protection—by forcing the Russian GPF navy to stay tied up defending SSBNs; 2) reducing the overall strength of a possible Russian nuclear attack on the US and so protecting the US proper; and/or, 3) to gain strategic leverage to affect the course of the war on the ground. This is not a theoretical issue. A Navy spokesman recently let it be known that, in a war with Russia, the Navy intends to use its submarines “to deny bastions to the Russians,” on behalf of “defending the homeland:” presumably meaning reducing the weight of a Russian intercontinental nuclear strike.


It is not known how authoritative the “announcement” of intent to execute strategic ASW was. At a minimum, however, it must be assumed that the idea is being entertained in some parts of the Navy’s system of strategic planning. It is also not known whether the Navy possesses the capabilities to execute the mission. The Navy spokesman did not address the matter, nor will this writer. Still, strategic ASW will always be a possibility as long as SSBNs exist. The serious problems it raises must be recognized and dealt with via the actions suggested here or otherwise. It is one of those rare missions where failure would be a far better outcome than success.

The Logic of Strategic ASW in the Current Era

Although the mission is to be carried out with conventional weapons, its consequences are mainly nuclear. Let’s look at three likely effects of prosecuting the mission and the policy actions implied for each.

Intercontinental nuclear war. Is a strategic ASW campaign a sensible choice? The answer is an unqualified No. The logic of the Cold War cannot be extrapolated to the situation vis-à-vis Russia today, or in the foreseeable future. A particularly misguided idea is that a successful ASW campaign would significantly reduce the damage the US would suffer should there be an intercontinental nuclear exchange. “Defending the homeland” through strategic ASW, as the Navy spokesman suggested, is simply impossible. SLBMs comprise a relatively small fraction of Russian intercontinental strike power. Even if the entire SSBN fleet were eliminated, a huge strike potential would remain in Russian ICBMs ashore, and only a small fraction of that would be more than capable of destroying the US as a nation.

In addition, a strategic ASW campaign could destabilize the longstanding, stable intercontinental nuclear relationship. The Russians might reasonably conclude that US willingness to attack the most secure components of their triad—missiles the US knows are the ultimate guarantors of the Russian state, missiles whose principal targets are the cities of the United States—must presage dire intent: regime change in Moscow, seizure of Russian territory, or even a disarming nuclear first strike. This last, backed up by air and missile defense of US territory against Russian retaliation, would mean that the US contemplates fighting a nuclear war. This idea was correctly rejected as a lethally dangerous impossibility during the Cold War. It makes no more sense today.

Strategic ASW is a grave step. It can only be justified if undertaken on behalf of the defense of a value deemed vital to the survival of the US as an independent nation. During the Cold War the US saw the prevention of Soviet dominance of Western Europe as exactly such a vital interest. The US committed itself to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons on behalf of that goal—first at the tactical battlefield level, then at the theater level, and ultimately at the intercontinental nuclear level. The logic of strategic ASW during the Cold War—which a number of US strategic thinkers strongly rejected at the time—was simple: Faced with possible defeat on the ground at the conventional level, the US planned to engage in strategic ASW to gain leverage over the Soviets, avoid nuclear escalation, or add to its strategic effect. Strategic ASW was indirectly endorsed by US allies in NATO for obvious reason: It reinforced the US commitment to the Alliance by showing that the US was willing to put its territory immediately at the same, or even greater, level of nuclear risk that its allies in Europe already faced.

Today, no US interest of comparable magnitude has been identified that would justify the risks entailed by strategic ASW. Moreover, no threat at the conventional level to any such interest has been identified or foreseen. On the contrary, while Russia enjoys local conventional superiority on the ground along its immediate periphery, it is the West that has the greater overall potential at the conventional level, especially at sea. Indeed, Russian strategists are likely well aware that Russia can use the world ocean only at the sufferance of the US and its allies (see the post “Global Embargo vs. Russia“).

The general conventional superiority of the West, particularly at sea, in and of itself, is a powerful reason for the West to avoid any actions that push the Russians in the direction of nuclear use. Threat of escalation is a common feature of Russian strategic declarations and seems hardly unexpected from the party that knows itself inferior in conventional capabilities.

Beyond the veiled “announcement” cited, little is known about current Navy thinking regarding the strategic ASW mission. However, during the Cold War two arguments were made in favor of its execution. First, it was said that by attacking Soviet SSBNs the US would tie down the GPF navy on the defensive and thus protect Western SLOCs.But protect against what threat? It is now generally recognized that the Soviet navy never in its 70-year history had any intention of attacking Western SLOCs on the high seas and indeed was not up to that mission if it had been ordered to execute it. Faced by an opponent possessing 60-plus of the quietest SSNs in the world—a most potent “fleet-in-being”—Soviet planners had little choice but to hold their GPF navy in an essentially defensive stance under almost all circumstances. If SLOC defense were the goal, actually executing strategic ASW to achieve it would have been superfluous—pointlessly putting at risk irreplaceable resources. 

Second, some in the US argued that attacks on Soviet SSBNs would not have had immediate escalatory effects because Soviet planners expected them. This last is almost certainly true but says little about how the Soviets might respond to a generally successful US campaign, especially if success came fairly quickly. The “use-them-or-lose-them” decision would have been extremely fraught for the Soviets. In August 1991 the Soviets conveyed to the world that they were capable of the “use” option when, reportedly, a Delta IV launched all sixteen of its missiles in less than four minutes. However, if missiles in the nuclear reserve were fired early, then the reserve would have failed to fulfill its reason for being, undercutting the broader Soviet design for war. Reserve nuclear missiles are not like committing a reserve battalion of tanks. If the missiles are fired at their presumed targets—US cities—the result would be an answering salvo of US missiles against Soviet cities. Acknowledging that the Soviets would not have been surprised when they found their SSBNs under attack says nothing about how they might actually have responded.

Suggested actions: These assessments of probable consequences mean that careful analysis of Russian calculations must be completed before reaching a decision about the desirability of the strategic ASW mission—or the absence thereof. Such analysis should be carried out at a level within the government commensurate with the potentially dire national impact of its results. Perhaps an assessment akin to the Nuclear Posture Review would seem appropriate. It is obvious that decisions of such gravity for the nation should not be made by one of the military services on its own, especially where within the Navy its submarine service is uniquely central to Navy decision-making regarding the mission.**

During the Cold War the Navy introduced the concept for strategic ASW, first through intensely private planning but, after a fairly short interval, quite publicly. It has now put strategic ASW back into the public domain today. Thus far, it appears to be acting on its own. Saying things like “what we [the Navy] are doing [strategic ASW] aligns with the National Security Strategy” (based on a GAO report reflecting strong Navy input) does not suffice. A strategic ASW campaign would put the survival of the nation directly at risk. The national decision-making process should be fully engaged. The NCA should issue explicit directions to the Navy on what to do, and not do, regarding strategic ASW vis-à-vis the Russians and generically for the long-term future of a mission that will likely be a potential as long as SSBNs are a factor in naval planning.

If the NCA’s decision goes against strategic ASW, then the mission should, at a minimum, be held in abeyance and that decision should become the object of national declaratory policy and of military-to-military diplomacy with the Russians. Words should be accompanied by deeds. Navy operations that can be construed as preparations for strategic ASW should be reviewed and adjusted accordingly. The Navy should suspend or end its ICEX operations, the most recent having occurred in the summer of 2018. One of the high points of ICEX is to practice and display improving capabilities to fire torpedoes under Arctic ice. Under-ice torpedoes are uniquely target-specific weapons. Their only conceivable targets would be Russian submarines, obviously including Russian SSBNs: a reality doubtless not lost on Russian navy planners.

A decision if, when, and how to suspend ICEX should itself be subjected to careful analysis. It could be argued that if the US is “giving up” a strategic capability, it should seek some “concession” of comparable strategic weight from the Russian side. Possibly. But it does not seem logical to continue to develop capabilities like under-ice torpedoes that you never will want to use. Never is used here advisedly. It is up to proponents of the strategic ASW mission to articulate the circumstances, if any, under which it might be executed. If under-ice torpedoes are needed for non-strategic ASW purposes, those purposes should be articulated and evaluated in light of their inescapable strategic ASW implications.

If, despite the logic and evidence adduced above, the NCA should decide that strategic ASW is desirable, then the Navy should be prepared to address, and answer with confidence, two questions that arise should execution of the mission become successful: First, would it lead to tactical nuclear war at sea?; and/or, second, would it have undesirable nuclear ecological consequences of unknown scale?

Tactical nuclear war. The Russians would be highly unlikely to accept defeat at the hands of US conventional strategic ASW forces without resort to use of their tactical nuclear ASW weapons. The Russians, like their Soviet predecessors, have many such weapons in their arsenal,*** and the threshold for their use is low for at least two reasons: 1) in contrast to their use ashore, nuclear weapons fired at sea produce no immediate collateral damage; and, 2) the Russians have placed great emphasis on their readiness to go nuclear in response to Western conventional superiority. The US no longer possesses nuclear ASW weapons and so could not answer in kind at sea, even if it wanted to, and would have no reason to escalate ashore. Independent of these military factors, the Russians could reasonably expect their decision to use nuclear weapons at sea would have a powerful demonstration effect on their adversaries, perhaps producing a fracture in the Western alliance if the US is seen as taking actions at sea, on a unilateral basis, that lead to nuclear escalation.

Suggested Actions: The Intelligence Community should be directed to estimate the capabilities for, and likelihood of, the use of Russian nuclear ASW weapons. The Navy itself should evaluate its readiness to fight a strategic ASW campaign in a tactical nuclear environment with existing conventional ordinance or, if deemed necessary, a new generation of US nuclear ASW weapons. Analysis should focus on the expected effects on the West should the Russians cross the nuclear threshold at sea in a variety of scenarios of war ashore. The course of war ashore is likely to be an important, if not the dominant, factor in determining the decisions of the Alliance—primarily the US NCA—regarding responses at sea and ashore. The degree of endorsement of US strategic ASW plans by allies should be assessed and, if need be, sought in advance.

Nuclear Ecological Damage. A successful campaign to kill Russian SSBNs would result in unavoidable and possibly catastrophic damage to the environment. At a minimum it would leave the sea floors of the Arctic Ocean, the Sea of Okhotsk, and adjacent Pacific waters littered with large amounts of radioactive material from nuclear reactors and from the many megaton-scale missile warheads that would be destroyed or damaged. In a worst case, a missile warhead might detonate resulting in the vaporization of the considerable volume of nuclear materials in other warheads if not their detonations as well. The intensity of the radiation and the area of its dispersal could be large. Immediate effects on US territory in Alaska and on allies like Canada, Norway, the UK, Japan, and Korea might be severe. Should longer term contamination of the global ocean follow, the continental US itself could be threatened.

During the Cold War, ecological damage of this kind was a lesser-included case in the nuclear Armageddon that confronted the world. Today, there are no issues at stake between the US and Russia that are remotely comparable to those vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. (Indeed, some students of US national security policy regard Russia as a minor “regional” annoyance compared to the emerging strategic competition between the US and China.)

Suggested actions: Review existing studies or initiate new studies of the ecological consequences of even a moderately successful campaign against Russian SSBNs, including estimates of the probability that attacks might detonate strategic nuclear warheads. The aim would be to verify that a strategic ASW campaign would not be ecologically self-defeating: a 21st century definition of Pyrrhic victory—sea control of waters that can no longer be used by humans. The Navy obviously must study these ecological questions internally and be able to able to answer them satisfactorily in public. Such questions would seem certain arise in the Congress from Alaska’s delegation, for example, or from private parties with deep commercial commitments in the Arctic like Exxon-Mobil. They will likely come from close allies who may fear exposure to toxic waters. Indeed, it will be surprising if US critics abroad, who have long charged that the US is indifferent to the fate of its allies in war, do not pick up this line of argument. The specter of apocalyptic damage to the world ocean will likely be raised.


The weight of fact and logic means that strategic ASW in the new era is simply a stunningly bad idea.

* Jeffrey Barker, deputy branch head for Policy and Posture in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Op 515B) in remarks delivered Dec. 4, 2018, at a forum at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, entitled “The Arctic and US National Security.” The Forum was streamed in real time and is available from the Center as a Webcast. Mr. Barker’s remarks were not a part of his prepared presentation. In Part 1, starting at 2h 9m, during Q&A, Mr. Barker observed that the purpose of bastion denial was “So that the Russians don’t have bastions to operate from—defending the homeland.” And “what we [the Navy] are doing [strategic ASW] aligns with the National Security Strategy.” First reported by Richard R. Burgess, “Navy Must Be Agile But Sustainable,” Sea Power Magazine, 04 Dec 18.

** The exact process through which strategic ASW was officially approved by the NCA is open to some uncertainty for future historians to resolve. That the Navy initiated the mission is not.

*** Wikipedia “R-29RM ‘Shtil’’ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R-29RM_Shtil

Bradford Dismukes, San Francisco, March 2, 2020

Propulsion Disablers – A Game-Changing Opportunity and Possible Mortal Threat


Propulsion disablers (PDs) are small torpedo-like devices that destroy a ship’s screws and rudders. The purpose of this essay is to describe: 1) the strategic, operational and tactical opportunities that PDs offer the US Navy; and, 2) the threat that PDs will likely pose to Navy surface ships. SSNs and SSBNs are not addressed.

Origins of the PD Idea

The PD concept has arisen purely to meet a strategic need. PDs appear to be an ideal weapon to implement an embargo strategy, sketched out below under “Opportunities for Use of PDs by the US and Allies” and detailed in the posts “Global Embargo vs. Russia” and “Global Embargo vs. China.” Here we have a strategy in search of a weapon rather than the reverse, as has too frequently been the case in the past. The PD is a child of strategic thinking, not technological development. The propulsion disablement idea has been around in principle for a long time. I first encountered it during the Cold War. The crisis intermingling between Sixth Fleet and the Fifth Eskadra led many to wonder: Why don’t we have a way to put our opponent’s ships out of action short of sinking them? What’s new today is the technical possibility of actually doing that. The idea that PDs might also threaten US surface ships is born of a simple maxim: If I can do it to him, he can probably do it to me; so I should think hard about my defenses.


It is assumed that production of PDs is technically feasible today, or in the foreseeable future, by the US and by its adversaries. Because the pace of innovation in the current era is so rapid, no attempt is made to estimate how quickly effective PDs might arrive (nor is the writer remotely capable of offering an opinion on that subject). However, their eventual appearance seems nearly certain and because of their attractiveness, the interval is likely to be short. The most likely form falls under the USN’s category of an underwater unmanned vehicle (UUV).

Naval ships depend on their mobility to employ their reason for being—their lethality. Depriving a ship of its mobility has essentially the same result as sinking it: the ship loses its lethality against targets beyond the range of onboard weapons. It also makes the ship a stationary target, vulnerable to seizure.

If a PD can deprive a ship of its mobility with minimal—ideally zero—damage to the platform itself or its crew, there would be military and unprecedented political consequences:

  • Unlike sinking, there would be no loss of an asset that expresses national sovereignty. Thus, there would be no, or at best an ambiguous, casus belli. In a situation where a PD was delivered by stealthy means, it might not be possible to identify with certainty the state or even non-state actor that “fired” it.
  • In a severe crisis or in war the propulsion disabler might be viewed as a qualitatively new form of warfare at sea not yet seen in the modern era. The world at large is rapidly being transformed by robotics and ever-growing computational power. It is obvious that navies are caught up in this vast transformation of human activity. One of its plausible long-term manifestations may well be many thousands of small, distributed, unmanned “robot” PDs challenging the dominance of the relatively few hundreds of manned warships that comprise established power on the surface of the sea today.

Capabilities and Employment Concepts

The Navy has long had in place a wide variety of UUV programs guided by Master Plans dating from the 2000’s. However, as publicly described, these plans do not give priority to PDs nor to defense against them. Existing technologies (e.g., miniaturization, computing power, extended battery storage, exotic propulsion means, etc.) and, critically, a warhead a small fraction of the size of torpedoes designed to sink ships—all suggest that a PD UUV might be small. It would also be passive, difficult to detect and capable of considerable range in both mobility and target detection, especially of large surface ships. PDs might be employed singly against civil ships, e.g., container ships, tankers, LNG carriers, etc. Against warships they might be employed singly, depending on their stealth, or perhaps in swarms. Swarms would seek to saturate defenses, overwhelm countermeasures and increase the probability that multi-screw ships can be completely disabled.

Emerging technologies are likely to enhance such capabilities, while efforts to reduce or mask the detectable signatures of traditional big ships are less likely to keep pace. PDs would mainly be delivered by air or submarine, though surface ships could also be armed with them for use in offensive embargo. A highly likely use would be as the warhead for stationary mines. Aircraft might deliver PDs against many enemy civil ships fairly rapidly over a wide area. Submarines might deliver many tens of PDs from modules already under development for other uses, or of new specialized types.

Opportunities for Use of PDs by the US and Allies

PD devices have potential for offensive use versus China, Russia, and lesser adversaries. PD capability would provide useful payoff at all levels of planning: At the tactical level in acute crisis, where threats may be ambiguous, the US NCA would not face a binary choice between sinking the adversary’s ship or letting it sail on. Deprived of its mobility, a PD-ed ship becomes a helpless, floating hulk to be seized or left for the adversary to retrieve and tow-away for repair. This latter would likely be a slow and arduous process. PDs would also be ideally suited to enforcing a embargo (see the posts “Global Embargo vs. China“and Global Blockade vs. Russia). Embargo runners could be disabled, and embargo-breaking defeated, with little or no issue of violating a state’s sovereignty coming into play.

At the operational level in war PDs might prove almost as effective as torpedoes in defeating the enemy because they would render target ships essentially useless and burden the enemy with retrieving ships and crews. At the strategic level mass use of PDs could yield considerable leverage. Consider the case of a hypothetical war with China: If a half-dozen Chinese warships and several dozen civil ships were disabled, the rest might then be kept in port—producing the effects of a successful embargo. China’s vulnerability to embargo is not yet widely recognized, but the nation is already highly dependent on seaborne importation of hydrocarbons, raw materials, and even foodstuffs (see the post “Global Embargo vs. China“). PDs are not a sine qua non of a strategic embargo design, but their low cost, widespread deployability—air, surface, and subsurface—and likely efficiency would make them an attractive component.

The Threat PDs May Pose to USN Surface Ships

The first obligation of the planner is to defend his own vulnerabilities. Our adversaries are surely as aware of the merits of PDs as are students of naval warfare in the West. They may be capable of producing large numbers of PDs from home-grown robotic and computer technologies, as well as strength in mass production of modern electronic devices. These factors suggest this threat should be taken seriously.

It remains to be seen whether PDs will prove to be just a new form of undersea threat to be answered with traditional ASW measures, or whether they may be transformative. It is hard to imagine an asymmetric capability more attractive to China or Russia: a fairly simple, inexpensive way, possibly difficult to defend against, to neutralize the surface ships of the world’s most powerful navy. Nor one where the disparity in costs were so great: many thousands of PDs produced at a fraction of the cost of a carrier strike group.

Possible Scenarios for Use of PDs by Adversaries

Consider three cases involving China:

(1) In peace, China successfully uses a PD against a US warship on a Freedom of Navigation operation near a Chinese-claimed area of the South China Sea. China denies all responsibility. The US searches for an appropriate response and is preoccupied with retrieving the ship.

(2) In a crisis at the brink of war, the Chinese do not fire explosives at an approaching CVSG. Rather they use PDs against the carrier. A successful attack would be a US nightmare: 110,000 tons of useless steel, drifting helplessly and displaying US impotence on worldwide television screens—a scene repeated over weeks until the ship can be towed away for repair—assuming China does not PD the tug. On the grounds of prudence, the US withholds commitment of the rest of the carrier force.

(3) In war, PDs may find a place as complements to kinetic or explosive weapons. They may be the weapon of choice because of their unprecedented military advantage: putting ships out of action, and forcing the opponent to rescue damaged ships and their crews.

Suggested Actions

  • Develop PD capabilities for offensive uses as outlined here. Just as important, give counter-PD a high priority in Navy planning for the defense of the carriers and the rest of the surface Navy.
  • Direct the Intelligence Community to search for signs of PD development in all of our adversaries’ actions, including in their open military writings.
  • Ensure that intra-Navy research and analysis addresses PD/counter-PD. (See the note below on some relevant Navy efforts.) The Navy should also request the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate to similarly adjust its focus. The JNLWD’s “Strategic Plan, 2016-2025” includes a category “Stop Large Vessels.” But the category had no content in 2018, and the Directorate’s general perspective is offensive with little corresponding concern about defending against an adversary’s non-lethal weapons.
  • Suggest to OSD national options to respond if a US Navy ship (or perhaps even a civil ship or ships of allies) were PD-ed. This should be done as a precautionary minimum to avoid being caught flatfooted by a surprise PD attack. Even today it may be possible that the Chinese could produce a primitive PD warhead for a stationary mine placed on the perimeter of claimed territorial waters. Should evidence come to light that an adversary has or may soon possess operational PD capabilities, policy decisions on the matter would be urgent and mandatory.


Even if the likelihood of the early emergence of PDs is assessed to be small today, the probability of their eventual appearance is high and the possible consequences of their introduction could prove revolutionary. This combination of probability and consequence dictates a serious need to think through immediate and long-term measures both to exploit PDs on offense and counter them on defense.

Note: Currently a wide variety of Navy UUV efforts are underway, including some recently and soon to be deployed hardware. None is focused on PD/counter-PD, as far as I have seen in information publicly available. The Coast Guard has shown specific interest in using a small torpedo—the Surface Ship Torpedo Defense (SSTD) currently being evaluated—for what is a PD in all but name. Employment of swarms of small underwater devices is in early stages of technical evaluation of their feasibility independent of a conception for their tactical use. https://news.usni.org/2018/06/26/navy-will-test-swarming-underwater-drones-summer-exercise and https://chuckhillscgblog.net/2013/06/20/navy-developing-small-anti-torpedo-torpedo-system-possible-cg-use.

Bradford Dismukes, San Francisco, March 2, 2020

CNA’s Open Source Analysis of Soviet Military Writings

Explanatory Note: CNA’s Soviet navy studies program in the 1970s and 80s analyzed the traditional bodies of evidence, classified and unclassified, including Soviet naval operations, exercises, building programs, etc. But its main focus was on analyzing open source Soviet military writings. I was a team member and the program’s director from 1973 to 1982. The program’s work and successes are described in my “The Return of Great Power Competition: Cold War Lessons about Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare and Defense of Sea Lines of Communication” Naval War College Review, Summer 2020, forthcoming. As I note in the post, open source writings yielded conclusions about Soviet strategic intentions eight years before the Intelligence Community reached identical conclusions drawn from traditional intelligence sources. Jamie McConnell and Bob Weinland were lead analysts. Others making important contributions were Susan Clarke, Mary Fitzgerald, Ken Kennedy, Hung Nguyen, Charlie Petersen, Richard Remnek, Abe Shulsky, Lauren Van Meter, and Barry Blechman (work published later as a Brookings Institution monograph).

This post describes the methodologies used at CNA during the Cold War. Its aim is to illuminate techniques that proved successful then with the hope that they may have something useful to say to analysts today. A conclusion suggests several measures that might inform open source work in the future.

FULL POST – CNA’s Open Source Analysis of Soviet Military Writings

 Analysts at CNA drew on all the standard sources of information, classified and unclassified, to infer the Soviet navy’s strategic purposes—building programs, operations, exercises, organizational structure, etc. But the major focus of effort was on interpretation of open source Soviet military writings. Analysts examined the adversary’s public statements at two levels: at the level of capabilities and tactics, taking their often revealing statements at face value; at the strategic level, reading what they say and inferring their true beliefs and intentions.

 For the big strategic questions open source writings provided the best and earliest answers. The experience of the Cold War showed that insights into Soviet planning at the strategic level rarely came from any other source—the 1980-81 SCI breakthrough being the momentous exception. Interpreting the Soviets at the strategic level relied on a variety of content analysis techniques long used in various fields of the social sciences: frequency of mention of a topic usually indicated its importance. Absence of reference to a salient topic could also signal importance. Imputing to your adversary plans to do something that he has never contemplated could suggest your own intentions. For example, the Soviets said that when the US Navy deployed the Trident SSBN, it intended to use its ASW forces to defend Trident against possible attack. Using these relatively simple techniques, a close reading of the Soviet military press in 1971-73 showed that the Soviets were seriously concerned about the possible vulnerability of their SSBNs and were intent on defending them—the so-called “pro-SSBN” mission.1

 Two other, more subtle, techniques yielded deeper strategic meaning: pure linguistic interpretation of the Soviet military vocabulary and inferences drawn from the byzantine forms of expression commonly used in Soviet military discourse. In the latter, the Soviets rarely stated an important point; they only implied it.2 Linguistic interpretation was central to James McConnell’s exegesis of the Gorshkov articles (1972-73) in Morskoy sbornik. This interpretation gave a larger strategic meaning to “pro-SSBN.”

 The single English word “defense” is rendered in Russian by two words: zashchita (защи́та) and oborona (оборона). McConnell detected in Gorshkov and in other authoritative Soviet writers that zashchita defense tasks were assigned by the General Staff, roughly equivalent to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The land-based missiles of the Strategic Rocket Forces were for zashchita (defense) to fight and win a war. Oborona  defense tasks, on the other hand, were assigned by the Defense Council, the highest political body dealing with defense, the equivalent of the US National Security Council. The missiles of the Soviet Navy—to be withheld from initial strikes, as described above—were for oborona (defense) to achieve the war’s political goals. This linguistic difference was highly indicative of the role of SSBNs as a strategic reserve.3

 Yet there was more evidence of this role to be found in analysis of the byzantine forms that often marked Soviet writings. Metaphor and (ostensibly) historical analogy were used to express an idea with real contemporary meaning. This form of exposition was presumably meant to communicate a message transparently to an internal audience, but obscured to outsiders. The most telling example, also from McConnell, was Gorshkov’s treatment of the Royal Navy’s Admiral Jellicoe in World War I. With one exception, the Battle of Jutland, Jellicoe did not commit the British Grand Fleet to battle. Instead the Fleet was held back as a “strategic reserve” in protected “bastions” at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys, while a world war raged on hundreds of miles to the south.

In the ensuing 40 years every Soviet naval historian, without fail, had excoriated Jellicoe. They said he should have come forward, destroyed the German navy, and help turn the tide (quite implausibly) in a frozen land war. Then, suddenly in 1973, Gorshkov reverses this assessment of Jellicoe: Jellicoe, he said, was right! He made the correct decision. Maintaining the Grand Fleet as a strategic reserve was wise because possessing a reserve of strategic power can be decisive in determining the outcome of a war. In other words, Gorshkov was saying, Jellicoe was smart to have his reserve. And I’ve got mine.

This mode Soviet expression was surely byzantine. In this sense it was similar to the alien idea it expressed—using a navy to protect a strategic nuclear reserve. It was alien to the modes of expression of US strategic thinking, yet its proper interpretation did yield a valid insight of considerable strategic utility. But it was not recognized as valid at the time. This was not a new problem. The Intelligence Community has had a blind spot to conclusions drawn from open sources from the earliest days of work in the field. Consider some cases where accurate conclusions were ignored or rejected:

  • World War II – Alexander George and others in the US and Britain analyzed Nazi war propaganda and drew valid forecasts of important German moves like the V1 and the V2 missiles and their tank offensive at Kursk. Their results were generally ignored, as George documented in a doctoral thesis at the University of Chicago.4
  • Korean War – Open source work forecast Chinese intervention if the US moved north.
  • Cold War – Besides CNA’s, important open source work of others were also ignored or rejected. Robert Herrick’s case was the most notable.

Despite, or perhaps because of, this rather dismal record, since the late 1990s, open source work has expanded, its status has been elevated, and, presumably, its conclusions are used more widely by the Intelligence Community today. The establishment of the National Open Source Center and the office of Assistant National Intelligence Director for Open Source bear witness to these advances.

The experience of the Cold War suggests several measures that could be adopted or enhanced across the discipline as whole to improve the quality and strengthen the utility of open source work. First, analysts should study systematically the phenomenon of “disinformation.” Disinformation is difficult, if not impossible, for any large organization to inject into its planning documents, except perhaps for the briefest periods. The simple reason is that you cannot lie to your own people without engendering confusion if not chaos. But detecting and guarding against disinformation is always an obligation both to avoid being tricked and, especially, so the open source analyst can assuage doubts about the reliability of open source work that many of its consumers harbor. The latter are usually convinced that they themselves would never publicly reveal their own true beliefs and intentions to their adversaries and are similarly convinced that their (secretive and duplicitous) adversaries follow the same dictate. Open source analysts have to be able to explain cogently how they reached their conclusions. In other words, analysts must be able to show that their techniques work not just in practice but also in theory.

 Second, analysts must make sure that conclusions drawn from open source work are properly protected. Just because the sources being analyzing are unclassified that does not mean the conclusions drawn are unclassified as well. Analysts need to be self-policing. For example, they should weigh carefully the desirability of putting into the public domain, most especially via the Internet, important conclusions bearing on important issues.

 Third, open source analysis would benefit from a general accounting of which of its many techniques are efficacious and which are less so. This would seem especially important where, today or in the future, some “analysts” on the internet may in fact be bogus, intent on misleading or confusing genuine academic debate. A record of systematic assessment of the discipline would also aid in the integration of open source work with other established sources of intelligence to produce genuinely “all source” intelligence. NIEs that do not include a healthy measure of evidence drawn from open sources are unlikely to be as accurate nor as substantial as they could be.


1. Hattendorf, citing Dismukes, “Evolving Wartime Missions of the Soviet General Purpose Force Navy,” (Secret) June, 1973 (Center for Naval Analyses 001061, p.16). John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004), chapter 2 (first published in a classified version as Newport Paper 6, 1989)

2. James M. McConnell, with Susan Clark and Mary Fitzgerald, “Analyzing the Soviet Military Press – Spot Report No. 1: The Irrelevance Today of Sokolovskiy’s Book Military Strategy,” Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, CRM 35-85 (May, 1985)

3. For a quite accessible account of McConnell’s methods and findings see Steven Walt, “Analysts in War and Peace” Professional Paper 458, (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1987) 4. Alexander George, Propaganda Analysis (Chicago, IL: Row, Peterson and Company, 1959)

Bradford Dismukes, San Francisco, March 2, 2020

Fleet-in-Being – The 17th Century Calls Out to the 21st Century


To investigate the relevance of the fleet-in-being concept in US Navy planning for the new era of great power competition and to evaluate its possible place with respect to other strategic missions in a range of scenarios for future war.

Defining Terms

Fleet-in-being is defined as withholding the main force from battle to pose a threat to an adversary.* The aim is to tie up their forces in a defensive posture and prevent their use for other tasks. First adopted by the Royal Navy in the late 17th century—it has, for obvious reasons, been employed by the weaker side. But it has also been used by the stronger navy if its offensive commitment seemed unlikely to affect the course of the war as a whole and/or because the potential loss of forces might have catastrophic consequences. Admiral Jellicoe’s decision to withhold the Grand Fleet during the First World War is the celebrated example of the latter. Jellicoe was popularly recognized as the man who could lose the war in an afternoon.

Jellicoe’s withholding decision was famously—to students of Soviet naval strategy—praised by Admiral Gorshkov in the series of articles in Morskoy sbornik entitled “Navies in War and Peace” (1972-73). Gorshkov was not so much writing history as making a veiled “announcement” that the Soviet Union had adopted a withholding strategy that kept their SLBMs as a strategic nuclear reserve to be protected by the GPF navy. Gorshkov, however, was more the bona fide historian when he also praised the ability of naval forces in-being to favorably affect the course of postwar negotiations with defeated enemies and for dealing with “erstwhile allies.” Gorshkov lamented the Tsarist navy’s inferiority at the end of the Crimean war, which obliged Russia to accept the unfavorable terms of the Treaty of Paris. This he saw as an example of the political utility of—in this case, British and French—naval forces as fleets-in-being.


Secretary Mattis announced in January 2018 that henceforth great power competition would constitute the basis for US defense planning. This historic change has dictated a review of the Navy’s experience during the Cold War in search of lessons relevant to the new era: Which strategic tasks should be carried forward unchanged (e.g., SLOC protection), which might need to be radically modified (e.g., early forward commitment of the carrier force), and which should be held in abeyance or even abandoned entirely (e.g., strategic ASW). Review of recent experience is not enough. The Navy must also consider historical concepts for the employment of naval power that played little or no role in its thinking during the Cold War. The fleet-in-being, along with the—global—embargo concept, is a leading example.

What Kind of War

The shape that war may take in the 21st century gives reason to reconsider the fleet-in-being concept. Clausewitz tells us “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking.” While it is impossible to foresee the future, it is nonetheless necessary to specify “the kind of war”—the range of strategic scenarios—that Navy planning must address.

World War II and the Cold War involved great land powers with ground forces engaged or squared off on a continental scale. War in the 21st century might be of similar dimensions and have existential consequences if only because of the arsenal of nuclear weapons possessed by the sides.

Equally if not more likely is a “small” war even with powerful peer competitors like China or Russia. Such a war, fought over relatively small stakes, might come about by accident, misunderstanding, or miscalculation. It is fairly easy to envision a small war where the importance of the issue at stake becomes magnified by nationalist sentiments. Indeed, future-minded historians like Y.N. Harari have already speculated that a variety of emerging technological and economic factors—leaving aside human stupidity—make war between the great powers on a continental scale less and less likely. This line of thinking does not mean a big war is impossible. It simply means that Navy strategic thinking should also encompass the possibility of small wars whose outcomes fall short of decisive victory: either stalemate, or perhaps a “victory” by one side that leaves the other with accumulated grievances and revanchist impulses. Thus arises the possibility of a small war leading to a series of small wars.


The primary advantage of the fleet-in-being is its high efficiency—defined, like the concept in physics from which it arises, as the ratio of the useful effect on the adversary’s behavior compared to the effort expended. If you possess the ability to attack, you do not have to attack. The sheer existence of that ability—perhaps enhanced through deployment, maneuver and deception—forces your adversary to prepare to counter, precluding other damaging actions.

Thus, fleet-in-being holds considerable promise to meet SLOC protection needs. The existence of powerful offensive forces, both surface and subsurface, can tie down enemy forces in a defensive posture. The existence of the US submarine force alone seems nearly guaranteed to keep the Russian sub force close to home defending SSBN bastions. Put yourself at the desk of the prudent naval planner in Moscow. Would you send your submarines forward, leaving undefended your homeland and the SSBNs that guarantee its survival?

Fleet-in-being fits well with a embargo strategy (see the posts “Global Embargo vs. Russia” and “Global Embargo vs. China“). In that strategy the carrier force would be assigned the task of sweeping the adversary’s naval and civil ships off the world’s oceans. Thus the force would have a strategically important task that makes it unavailable for immediate forward commitment, in effect preserving the carriers as a fleet-in-being. Finally, fleet-in-being is a strategy that conserves forces and may be well suited to the kinds of wars—big and small—that Navy planning should confront. Big wars are examined below under “cons.”

In small wars, as outlined earlier, Pyrrhic victory would carry ignominy. The advantages accruing to the side that emerges with a strong fleet-in-being are obvious. Moreover, a “small” war could easily become a big one should US losses be unexpectedly large—say, the thousands of casualties involved in the loss of one or even several CVSGs, not to speak of the great psychological impact the loss of such prominent symbols of national sovereignty would entail. The political momentum within the US of demands for revenge or compensation could transform a conflict over a relatively small stake into something much larger and more difficult to contain. It would be an historic irony if Navy actions aimed at winning a small war contributed to or even triggered a massive escalation of hostilities. Some may find consideration of such possibilities distasteful or even defeatist. However, sentiment should not cloud thinking about how to deal with possible cold realities. This scenario seems plausible and provides another reason to withhold battle forces or commit them forward in as careful and calibrated a manner as the vicissitudes of war allow.


Fleet-in-being violates the offensive spirit of the Navy. It is probably fair to say that the idea of withholding superior forces from battle has found little, if any, favor in the Navy’s strategic thinking in the modern era. Indeed, starting with Midway, offense was the dominant ethos of the Pacific campaigns of the Second World War.

What’s more, Fleet-in-being is in obvious conflict with the early forward commitment of the carriers that was a principal feature of the Cold War’s Maritime Strategy. In a big war in the future, decisions regarding the forward commitment of carrier tactical aviation should be based, as before, on assessments of the adversary’s expected responses to Tacair strikes on its territory, and the contribution that carrier Tacair might be expected to make on the course of the war. To these, fleet-in-being considerations should be given equal weight. (I am indebted to Michael Kofman for pointing out that the Navy could have considered fleet-in-being options during the Cold War. As a Cold Warrior myself I can report that the idea never came up as far as I was aware. Quite the contrary, attack, and the earlier the better, dominated thinking.) Finally, historically, British naval leaders who adopted a fleet-in-being strategy, whether successful or not, often did not then fare well in the nation’s postwar political processes.*** Whether such history might affect today’s leadership of the Navy is unknowable.


Fleet-in-being is a concept that deserves careful consideration as the Navy thinks through strategies for future war, both big or small. It seems well suited to “small wars” that appear plausible, even with a peer competitor. Fleet-in-being complements a global embargo strategy should it be pursued.

The concept is in clear tension with the early forward commitment of the carriers that was the hallmark of the 1980s-era Maritime Strategy. A decision to commit the carriers forward need not be made simply because attack is their raison d’être—the mission that they have trained for and are eminently ready to carry out.

The dilemma that the Navy should consider is exactly the one that Jellicoe faced: My forces are the most powerful in the world. They are highly trained and eager to go to battle. But will their commitment at some particular point be likely to affect the course of the war as a whole? If not, why commit? Or, will their potential losses result in unsought escalation of the conflict, Pyrrhic victory, or worse? History has yielded a favorable judgment on Jellicoe’s decision. Twenty-first century strategic thinking should take history’s judgment of fleet-in-being into account.

*See John B. Hattendorf, “The Idea of a ‘Fleet in Being’ in Historical Perspective,” Naval War College Review (Winter 2014). For a general assessment see Geoffrey Till’s magisterial Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (4th ed.) (London: Routledge 2018).

**Yuval Noah Harari, 21 Ideas for the 21st Century (New York: Spiegel and Grau, 2018), pp. 69-72.

***Hattendorf, p. 167

Bradford Dismukes, San Francisco, March 2, 2020

About the Author

I’m a political scientist who worked at the Center for Naval Analyses (1969-99) with a group that supported and critiqued ONI and OPNAV planners and analyzed the Soviet military press. I directed the group 1974-89. I retired as a Captain in the Naval Reserve after service in Naval Intelligence. This blog aims to contribute to an understanding of the history of the US Navy in the Cold War, to draw lessons from that and earlier periods for the current era, and to conjecture about possible future developments for which history may provide no guide.

Bradford Dismukes
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