Close Iran, Open Hormuz

Introduction

This post is the text that accompanies a slide presentation on a naval mine blockade strategy briefing entitled “Close Iran, Open Hormuz.” The briefing is by Bradford Dismukes, Capt., USNR (ret.), with Bruce F. Powers, SES-4 (ret.) and Peter M. Swartz, Capt., USN (ret.). It is currently being presented to interested people and institutions concerned with national and naval strategy. Its immediate purpose is discussion and critique with the aim of improving it. It is also hoped that this briefing will help make the existence of the naval mine blockade strategy option known to the nation’s senior leadership which, by all evidence in the public domain, has never been made aware of it.

SLIDE 1
Good morning. I’m Brad Dismukes, here to talk about a national naval mine blockade strategy in the war against Iran. Note that this a national strategy, not purely naval, and the level of focus is that of strategy, which Clausewitz tell us means plans not to win a battle but to win a war.

SLIDE 2
In the 2020s a naval mine blockade strategy has taken on an unprecedented potency that merits giving it a prominent place in national plans for diplomacy and wars of a lesser scale than major military conflict with China and/or Russia. Today’s war against Iran can be considered a test case of the efficacy of a naval mine blockade strategy. Specifically, will it produce victory over the defeat the mullah regime of Iran? Naval mine blockade is not the only, but it is the main U.S. military strategy to achieve victory over the mullahs. Mine blockade has two broad goals:
1) to “close Iran, open Hormuz;”
2) to prevent Iran from ever acquiring nuclear weapons.

The U.S. has a third goal: to see the replacement of the current autocratic regime of the mullahs by a new democratic government. This goal cannot be achieved by any military means that the USG would choose to pursue, i.e., full scale invasion of Iran and occupation of Tehran.

SLIDE 3
Nonetheless, the military defeat of the mullahs will produce conditions that will almost certainly result in a contest for a new government in Iran. The length and scale of the contest will depend on the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps). If IRGC deserts the mullahs to look after its own fate, the contest could be short with minimal violence. If IRGC stays loyal, the mullahs will fight on, leading to possible long, violent civil war. This would be a new phase of conflict involving Iran that will give rise to new rounds of analysis of the role of the U.S. in it.

SLIDE 4
The U.S. must set priorities among its strategic goals. To repeat, the first goal, “Close Iran, Open Hormuz” must be pursued immediately. The second goal to prevent Iran from ever acquiring nuclear weapons should be put on hold till the primary goal is achieved. All U.S. allies, especially Arab Gulf states, are all in on the immediate goal and will bend maximum effort to achieve it. They are less urgently committed to Iran’s denuclearization because they have lived with decades of efforts to produce that result. They know that there are no circumstances under which the U.S. would accept a nuclear Iran. Indeed, no nation believes Iran should have nuclear weapons, not even Russia. Denuclearization can safely be given a secondary priority in a temporal sense. As will be discussed later, naval mine blockade has great promise to leverage Iran to forswear nuclear weapons in perpetuity.

SLIDE 5
Whatever are U.S. strategic priorities, what, specifically, is the U.S. fighting to achieve? By closing the Strait of Hormuz and attacking the territories of its neighbors, the mullah government has attacked, damaged, and holds hostage the economies of all the states of the world. Nothing like this has ever happened before. Iran commits an historic wrong. To right this wrong the United States and its allies will take strong military and political actions against Iran and declare that these actions will not end until Iran opens Hormuz, allows free navigation throughout the Gulf, and ceases its attacks on the territories of U.S. Arab allies and Israel. When such conditions are met, this phase of the war will be over, and the United States will be the winner. The U.S. will fight on to achieve other political goals, as we will discuss later.

SLIDE 6
Before going on, we need to specify collegial aims of this briefing. When I say “we,” I mean the community of analysts, especially analysts of naval and national strategy, whose immediate purpose is to investigate the naval mine blockade strategy and improve it by resolving important issues and identifying new ones needing further research.

The larger purpose of this meeting is to help raise the awareness of our nation’s senior leadership, which, unfortunately, does not know that the “Close Iran, Open Hormuz” option even exists. A second such purpose is to call attention to the fact that implementing the strategy is a complex, all-of-government undertaking, and all its components must be taken up simultaneously. Each is critical; the failure of any single one can reduce the chances for success of the whole.

SLIDE 7
Now, to the business at hand. As every serious strategy must, we have to define victory. Here it is a situation where Iran:
– Foreswears a nuclear weapons program in perpetuity
– Ends its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and its attacks on shipping throughout the Gulf
– No longer attacks its Arab neighbors, Israel, and U.S. forces in the region
– Issues an apology in the United Nations for the damage its erroneous policies have caused to the Arab Gulf states and to the world economy
– Offers reparations to its Arab neighbors
– Adopts a self-determined, democratic government and rejoins the world economy and community of nations.

SLIDE 8
To achieve these goals, the U.S. and Israel will resume missile and air strategic bombardment against a carefully tailored target set, which we will define later, and impose a naval mine blockade. The blockade would aim to: 1) force Iran’s navy to stay in port or near-shore waters; 2) deprive Iran of hard currency earned through the export of oil and its products; 3) lead to mass starvation by denial of food imports; 4) mean Iran’s economy would never grow again—unless the blockade is relaxed or removed—a decision entirely in U.S. hands.

A couple of points to keep in mind: Even if Iran should prove able to brush away U.S. minefields (which seems quite unlikely), the U.S. and its allies could seize any tankers of Iran or its friends before they transited to market. The U.S. and its allies would never attack or sink a laden tanker in the Gulf, for reasons explained later.

SLIDE 9
To prosecute the war, the USG would announce its intentions to “Close Iran, Open Hormuz.” The U.S. will lead a large consortium of its allies for multiple military actions that enjoy strong political support. Twenty-five to 35 allies, inside and outside the Gulf, strongly oppose Iran and will provide military forces. But the U.S. must first consult with its allies and provide leadership for a collective effort. If the USG acts unilaterally against Iran, it strengthens the mullahs at home and abroad and weakens its own position in both spheres. The USG must recognize that this dynamic is real. It must consult with allies, particularly Arab allies in the Gulf, and give them a titular and substantive role and as much responsibility as possible. The shared goal of subduing the common Iranian enemy should Ieaven inter-Arab rivalries. Examples of how to do this will be looked at later.

SLIDE 10
To “Close Iran,” it is assumed that a U.S. mine blockade can prevent Iran from exporting and importing from all its ports (including Caspian) and that Iran lacks the means to remove U.S. mines. This assumption is well founded. Mine removal anywhere is a laborious, time-consuming process that is made longer yet if the mine fields are defended and reseeded by their owners. Note that in the Gulf today 1) each side blockades the other and 2) Iran defends and reseeds its mines. The U.S. would do the same if the need arose.

Also, can the U.S. complete Iran’s isolation from the world? Can the U.S. make Iran a “no-fly zone,” destroy all air transport aircraft on the ground and possibly in the air? Can the U.S. interdict the one rail line and all the roads leading into the Iranian nation, or simply persuade Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkmenistan not to allow aid to pass across their borders?

SLIDE 11
Mine blockade strengthens the position of the U.S. by bringing quite potent, unused U.S. military power into play. It can do this at very low cost and essentially zero risk. It can force Iran to devote resources to respond to it that possibly could be used for other purposes damaging to the U.S. and its allies. The nearly rhetorical question arises: Why would the U.S not mine blockade Iran?

SLIDE 12
Nonetheless, doubts, or at least uncertainty, about Iran’s ability to defeat a U.S. mine blockade do exist. This crucial assumption has yet to be assessed by analysts specializing in mine warfare. If they judge that Iran can easily remove U.S. minefields, your speaker will apologize to all for leading an excursion into a blind alley and return to the workbench to redraft this talk. In the hope and expectation that will not be necessary, let’s continue the session as is.

SLIDE 13
We were talking about mine blockade’s effects. Blockade’s cutting off imports must not allow Iran’s populace starve. The U.S. must call on the United Nations to declare Iran a humanitarian disaster zone and oversee the delivery of food to Iran in the way it has done in Gaza. The U.S. will permit ships delivering food to pass through corridors through its mine fields, the location of which is known only to the U.S. These corridors are the basis for the unique ability of the U.S. to control events. The U.S. can decide what and who is aboard those ships and the rate at which they sail.

Under its leadership, the U.S must organize Arab/Muslim groups, European and Asian allies, and other friendly states to provide food aid to Iran. All international organizations would support U.S. No one would support Iran except Russia and its allies. Iran’s populace may not starve, but Iran’s economy will not grow. It will likely collapse as a result of denial of bulk exports (oil/LPG) and imports (everything large and heavy) by sea. Note that mine blockade, coupled with air and overland blockade, prevents Iran from importing anything with which to rebuild its military and fuel economic growth of any kind. Iran will face immiseration because its government engages in policies that damage all the states of the rest of the world. To repeat: The mullahs are at war with the world.

SLIDE 14
The U.S. will limit blockade action and exploit arms control to weaken international political support for Iran and build corresponding support for U.S. and allies. The U.S. will not attack Kharg Island or Iran’s oil infrastructure anywhere, under any circumstances. As will be described, the U.S. will exploit a “green” strategy. Mine blockade makes attacking oil infrastructure pointlessly redundant. The U.S. will seize any Iranian ship that tries to sail south. It will incarcerate the crew, and give the ship and cargo to its Arab allies as compensation for the damage that Iran has already inflicted on them. The U.S. and allies will never give Iran any justification for answering attacks on the oil facilities of its Arab neighbors. If Iran nonetheless attacks, the mullahs will be unable to justify their irresponsible actions to an incredulous world.

In addition, the U.S. will exploit arms control to further shackle Iran. It will seek a resolution in the U.N. Security Council or, if necessary, in the General Assembly under the Uniting For Peace procedure, to 1) prohibit delivery of sea mines to Iran and 2) to ban the use of sea mines in international waters anywhere in the world. The second is in the U.S. interest in its own right and will find strong international support.

SLIDE 15
The U.S. must mount a major InfoWar campaign as a vital complement to its diplomacy. Events have shown that: 1) thus far the mullahs are little concerned with the possible starvation of Iran’s own population because ships importing food to Iran continue to pass unimpeded to its ports; and 2) Iran is utterly indifferent to certain starvation of tens of millions of human beings elsewhere in the world that the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) forecasts will die for lack of the Gulf’s fertilizer whose export Iran blocks. Iran’s blockage of Hormuz, attacks on civilian infrastructure in all states within range of its weapons, and indifference is reckless, Hitlerian behavior. All states, bar Russia and its allies, will oppose Iran and rally behind the United States.

SLIDE 16
The U.S. will give a “green” strategy new prominence in its InfoWar and political-diplomatic policy. To do so is highly advantageous. It exploits the world’s growing green political sentiment and the growing, money-spinning, green segment of the world economy. The world knows that war anywhere damages the ecology of the region where it is fought. Iran has already complained that Israeli strikes on its refineries and oil storage have produced “black rain” on Tehran but it nonetheless continues to attack the same oil refineries and storage facilities of its Arab neighbors. The United States and its allies will not do such a thing. They call on all states, including Iran, to match their commitment to protect the ecological environment in the ongoing war.

Following such a green strategy costs the U.S. and its allies near to nothing, but it inhibits, perhaps deprives, Iran the use of one of its main weapons, attacks on the oil infrastructure of its Arab neighbors, that Iran has exploited since the war has entered the current phase that began with U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran on February 28.

SLIDE 17
The highlight of the U.S. InfoWar and U.S. diplomacy is President Trump’s MIGA concept. MIGA shows the U.S. is not at war against Iran’s populace but only against the current, murderous regime. It means U.S./allied missile/tacair strikes will avoid the Artesh as much as possible, and also avoid desalinization plants, whose destruction disproportionately harms Iran’s civilian population far more than it reduces the mullahs’ ability to fight. A MIGA strategy appeals to patriotic Iranians. Its aim is to peel Artesh off from the mullahs. All actions of this strategy support MIGA’s vision of a reborn Iranian nation.

SLIDE 18
There can be no MIGA if Hormuz is not open. Today more than 125, perhaps 200 friendly ships are ready, loaded, and crewed to sail south. Many more can be made ready. All can be insured by the USG’s Development Finance Corporation. The DFC provides political risk insurance for maritime trade throughout the Gulf. On March 6, 2026, the DFC announced a $20 billion maritime reinsurance facility coordinated with CENTCOM. The USG should invite Arab Gulf governments to underwrite its ship insurance as part of their responsibilities in prosecution of the war. Insured ships will bring oil to market, stabilize prices, and meet an enduring global need.

SLIDE 19
“Close Iran” may achieve success too slowly. Simultaneously, the U.S. and its allies must prevail in military action to “Open Hormuz” and restore free navigation throughout the Gulf. Mine blockade will free U.S./allied forces afloat to concentrate on this task. In any case, the U.S. must never follow a strategy that requires interception of merchant ships in international waters outside the Gulf war zone. That would not only be a gross violation of international law it would be contrary to the hallowed principle of Freedom of Navigation to which the 13 colonies adhered even before they united to become the USA in 1783.

SLIDE 20
For purposes of this discussion I will sketch out a hypothetical combat scenario centered on Hormuz. This will need to be addressed in another, separate session. Hormuz is where the fight will focus, where the war will be decided. CENTCOM, Fifth Fleet, and the Joint Staff will be responsible for what actually happens in the real world.

The scenario: The side that has superior knowledge of its enemy’s actions is likely to prevail. Therefore the U.S. should:
– Maximize its ISR (including undersea surveillance) at Hormuz.
– Focus electronic warfare on defeating Shahed and other drones that threaten ships in Hormuz and throughout the Gulf. (Air defense and other actions to defeat Shahed drones and Iranian cruise and ballistic missiles appears to be a crucial issue.)
– Declare the Strait a “no-fly-no-sail” zone.
– Exploit robot mine-clearing capabilities of European/Asian allies, who have specialized in MCM for many decades.
– Attack or seize anything afloat that is not positively identified as friendly.
– Seek out and attack the enemy wherever found, including its forces on Hormuz’s eastern and northern shore and their supply lines.
– Use SEAD capabilities at longer ranges and, closer in, use battlefield helicopters and tacair like the A-10 Warthog. (From Dubai and Ras al Kaimah airports to Bandar Abbas airport is less than 50 miles.)
– Mine Iran’s coastline and isolate enemy islands with super-sensitive mines.
– Mobilize and pay the friendly fishing and coastal commerce fleets as maritime militias which could be invaluable in defeating their Iranian counterparts and clearing floating mines. (This is another example of Gulf Arab states taking responsibility for their own security.)
– Defend own forces and populations and infrastructure on the Musandam peninsula, Ras al Kaimah, and Dubai city. – Adjust the Hormuz “no-sail zone” to allow friendly ships to move north and south in the near-shore corridor.
– Declare that it is the certain intention of the U.S. to withdraw from any Iranian territory it may have occupied and, in any case, cease operations only when free navigation is restored throughout Gulf.

SLIDE 21
Of all the military actions proposed here, it is naval mine blockade that underwrites achievement of the top two U.S. war goals, namely, 1) opening Hormuz and 2) Iran’s denuclearization, with the former taking temporal priority. Iran is powerless against blockade; Russia cannot help. Mine blockade closes Iran, collapses its economy, and immiserates its populace. The U.S. can keep its mine blockade in place as long as it wishes at essentially no cost. In fact, the timing and conditions of the removal of U.S. mines gives the U.S. the upper hand in diplomatic negotiations to end combat and reach a settlement that is satisfactory to the U.S., which is a good definition of victory.

SLIDE 22
If the mullahs are defeated, what will replace them? The answer is a self-determined, democratic-elected government. It is reasonable to expect such a government to emerge organically has the result of political forces already long existing with in Iran’s society. The U.S. and its allies can assist the new government rewrite Iran’s constitution and bring Iran out of seventh-eighth century A.D. into the Enlightenment era of the 18th century —the era of U.S. Declaration of Independence (1776) and Federal Constitution (1783) and of French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789). The Islamic Republic of Pakistan shows that the democratic practice of the rule of law can function in a theocratically based society. A new Islamic Republic of Iran can replace a “Supreme Leader,” with democratically elected one U.S./democratic nations have historic opportunity to help.

SLIDE 23
Tragically, we must remind ourselves that there is no sign the senior leadership U.S. Government has been made aware that the mine blockade option even exists. President Trump, Vice-President Vance, SecState/NSA Rubio, SecWar/Defense Hegspeth, Ambassadors Wickoff and Kushner have never even mentioned it. Lamentably, their huge staffs apparently remain in the dark, as do strategists on the Hill and in the Media.

The United States Government must recognize and use mine blockade today. In the foreseeable future, this powerful weapon in its arsenal of strategies for dealing with an increasingly dangerous, unpredictable world. To restate: hopefully, this session will help make that recognition more likely.

And that is a good note on which to finish these remarks. I look forward to our discussion where I can be an attentive listener instead of just a talker. Thank you all for coming today.

BACK-UP SLIDE 24
Wait a minute. This is not the last session we are going to have on mine blockade. I would be grateful if any of you who have the time could listen to and critique the general conclusions I and my colleagues have drawn about mine blockade.

The first is that its potency is widely, wildly underestimated. If there is war, there will be blockade. At least there has not been war without blockade since 1914. In the last year of World War I modern scholarship has confirmed that the British blockade of Germany and Austria-Hungary produced widespread starvation in their populations and fueled strong sentiment in Germany in support of ending the fighting. Unhappily, this scholarly finding is little recognized. Most people, even in the analytical community, continue to think that blockade by either side had much effect on the war’s outcome.

And there has been no war where each side did blockade the other – as is the case in the Gulf today. Naval mines have played a central role throughout past wars and in negotiations to end combat and to seek settlement. They will be so in this war with Iran and in wars and lesser conflicts yet to come.

Mine blockade is strategically efficacious. It can determine the course of war and contribute significantly to war’s outcome. It will cause starvation of the enemy’s population and weakening or collapse of enemy’s war economy.

No states are truly invulnerable to mine blockade. Only a few do not depend on imported food and fuel (Russia, the U.S., and possibly France). All island states are completely dependent on imports. All U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific are islands, as are many in the Euro-Atlantic.

Mine blockade is highly efficient. The weapons needed are orders of magnitude less expensive than the forces they threaten; defeating blockade requires far more resources than imposing it.

Blockade is the least escalatory strategy available, does not threaten the enemy’s populace, leadership, or territory, including nuclear forces of all kinds

Blockade of Iran has revealed that the United States has a new, unprecedented weapon of significant power in its arsenal of strategies for diplomacy and war.

POSSIBLE PREAMBLE SLIDE
What are we doing here? What justification do we have for addressing the profound questions before us? Two answers:

First, we are a democracy. We depend on our government “… to ensure domestic Tranquility and provide for the common defence….” Our citizens pledge to provide blood and treasure on behalf of those goals, and so we are patriots. We have standing.

Second, the people and institutions here today, and many not present, are the nation’s strategic brain. The nation’s strategic thinkers include active and retired officers of the armed services, of the Foreign Service, and the Intelligence Community, members of both houses of the Congress and their staffs, semi-public institutions like the war colleges and FFRDCs (RAND, CNA), universities, think tanks (including many for profit) and the Media—the Post, Times, Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, The New Yorker, and The Atlantic—as well as strategists abroad like Sir Lawrence Freedman. In our democracy this diverse collection of people and institutions is, critically, its sole mechanism for self-correction. We have agency.